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Introduction 
 
 
 
  
 
 
InSIEME (Infrastructure Security In Electricity Markets) is a GIS-based application 
that aims at supporting system analysis of complex, highly interconnected systems  
(i) by determining the reaction of such systems to abnormal initial events that affect 
their operability state and (ii) by providing visual spatial data representation of the 
system state. 
 
InSIEME is an application that targets business decision makers, policy makers, 
other stakeholders, professionals. 
 
The application is mainly designed for the evaluation of critical infrastructure 
systems, which usually are characterized by a large number of components from 
different, and not necessarily evident related, subsystems. The system under 
discussion in InSIEME is the Italian 360 kV Electricity Grid. 
 
InSIEME is developed as a CRISA (Critical Infrastructures Security Assessment 
Assistant) project, which confers increased capabilities of analysis of complex system 
architectures, as well as of the functionality, capabilities and interconnectivity of 
constituent parts, based on various types of data characterizing the system. In 
addition, two models - of error dispersion and influence flow were developed and 
implemented, in order to enhance the capabilities of the project in assisting decision 
making processes.  
 
A major goal for InSIEME was to prove the viability of a new approach in the applied 
systems analysis, which consists in building a system and perform simulations 
starting from the GIS representation of the system under discussion. In other words, 
the GIS is not primarily used for visualizing the system, but as a source for system 
definition. This is in fact a different approach to the Application – GIS relationship. In 
most cases the system is first analytically defined, and then the GIS is used to 
visualize the defined system (analytical – GIS approach). Instead, InSIEME takes the 
other way around, which means that the analytical representation of the system is 
built based on an already existing GIS representation (GIS – analytical approach).  
 
In line with these, in InSIEME the system analysis would typically consist of two 
major phases: 
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1. Define the System starting from the GIS representation. 
2. Analyze the System using the error dispersion and influence flow models. 
 
A collection of toolsets for both phases of system analysis was provided. 
 
The proposed models are designed to represent complex, interconnected systems by 
the interdependencies of the constituent components, as well as to simulate the 
cascade effects phenomenon that occurs in this type of architectures.  
 
Several remarks are in order, from the outset: first, the focus is not on the cause of 
the error, but on the effect, considered here as 'the lack of capability of service 
providing'. The cause that leads to the incapability of service providing is not taken 
into account. The models try to simulate how component operability influences the 
operability of the related component(s) and how this effect is spreading itself 
(diffuses) within the system. 
 
Throughout this paper the incapability of service providing will also be referred to as 
error or effect. 
 
Second, the models do not simulate the effect propagation based on physical, 
operational or any other types of additional models. InSIEME’s are generic models 
that have to be customized for each type of application. 
 
The system is analyzed and characterized from this incapability of service providing 
point of view. InSIEME provides information regarding (i) the overall functionality of 
the system, and (ii) the operability of the components, given a number of  
components that operate at a lower than optimal level. This can be seen as a two-
level analysis, one at the system component level, and the second at the 
infrastructure level. 
 
The models address two approaches for the system analysis: the first one  - the 
Static Model, provides visual and analytical representations of the system state given 
an initial distribution of components operating at different levels of capability. The 
second, the Dynamic Model, allows the dynamic analysis of the system state when 
the distribution of error-characterized components as well as their operability levels 
vary in time. Moreover, the Dynamic Model allows the visualization and tracing of the 
error diffusion on a step-by-step basis. 
  
Chapter 2 of this paper presents the rationale behind the InSIEME simulation part. 
The formalism for the analytical representation of the system and the general 
description of the proposed models – The Error Dispersion Model and The Influence 
Flow Model – are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 covers aspects related to 
InSIEME application, focusing on the user-interface and the typical workflows. In 
Chapter 5 two relevant examples of system analysis are given, for both the Static 
and Dynamic type of simulations. Finally, Chapter 6 offers several concluding 
remarks regarding the work and presents some possible improvements and further 
developments. 
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Rationale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both simulation models (static and dynamic) start from the same assumptions, 
namely:  
 
♦ The System is made of components.  
♦ The components are classified in classes, based on either type, functionality, or 
characteristics. 
♦ The components interact with each other (the operability of one component 
influences the operability of one or several of the other components). 
♦ Weights of influence are established between the classes and are considered to 
be a priori known. The weights characterize the level at which a component from 
one class affects a component from another (how much an operational 
incapability of a component from one class influences the capability of a 
connected component belonging to another class, or what percent of the 
incapability of service-providing of one component goes to the component(s) 
related to it). 
♦ The errors are introduced in the system through Error Injection Points (EIP). 
♦ The errors diffuse within the system on Influence Levels, via Error Injection 
Routes (EIR). 
 
In the sequel, a more detailed look at the models is offered. 
 
The system state of ‘health’ is given by its components’ capability of providing the 
service. A system is considered fully functional when all the constituent components 
present no deficiency in providing the service they are designed for.  
 
A component's failure in providing the service (initial event) leads to a failure 
(decrease of capability) of the components related to it. The newly influenced 
components affect the components related to them, and so on. The error propagation 
is one-directional. The process continues until all the components are affected or the 
error is damped out. The error at the component’s level leads to a perturbation in the 
overall system functionality. 
 
The model introduces the Error Injection Points as a source of disfunctionality of the 
system. An EIP is a virtual system component, and can be attached to any system 
component (the component is declared as EIP). The level of operability of the system 
component is controlled through the EIP. A system can present one or more EIPs. 
  
Chapter 2 – Rationale 
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The error is spreading throughout the system starting from the EIP, on Influence 
Levels (IL), following Influence Paths (IP) also referred to as Error Injection Routes 
(EIR). The Influence Levels are characteristic to every EIP and are generated 
radially, having the EIP as origin. Mainly, the process can be synthesized as follows: 
the EIP component first influences the components directly related to it (first level of 
influence), then, each of the components of the first level influences the ones directly 
connected to them (second level), and so on. The process ends when no 
components are found to be influenced, or the system boundaries are reached. For 
fully interconnected systems, the process ends when all the components are 
reached. 
 
The following important assumption is worth emphasizing when generating the 
influence levels: a component may influence the interconnected components only 
one time, and the influenced components do not influence the influencing 
component. This means that the influence process is not bidirectional. For example, 
if the system component B is influenced by the system component A, A will not be 
influenced by, or influence again B. 
 
 
InSIEME Influence Propagation Law: a component may influence the 
interconnected components only one time, and the influenced components can not 
influence the influencing component. 
 
 
In this process, the influencing component (the source) is referred to as parent, while 
the affected components are referred to as children ("kids”).  
 
In the parent-kid approach, the condition above can be read as 'a component 
becomes parent only one time, and it is not influenced by its kids’. 
 
Every EIP contributes with the generated error at the components’ level to the total 
error of the system components. The contributions are cumulative. 
 
The following assumptions are made regarding the propagation of error in crossroad 
situations (Fig. 3.1) 
 
Note that in the crossroad cases above, the weights of influence between 
components are not taken into account. This approach can lead to an amplification of 
the error effect in the junction case Fig 3.1(b). 
 
Two quantities are introduced: (i) the Incapability Index, specific to the system 
component, to characterize the capability of service providing of the components 
and, (ii) the Infrastructure Failure Index to characterize the overall system health 
state, based on the constituent components Incapability Indexes. 
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Case Behavior Description 
One component influences more than 
one component (split) 
 
In this case one considers that the 
influencing component conveys the 
same error to all the related components. 
 
More than one component influence a 
single component (junction) 
 
In this case one considers that the 
influenced component is affected by all 
the influencing components. The error of 
the influenced component is computed 
as the sum of all contributions from the 
influencing components. 
 
 Figure 3.1(a) Split, (b) Junction 
 
The next chapter gives a description of the error dispersion and influence flow 
models implemented in InSIEME. 
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The Models – Formalism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter a detailed description of the error dispersion and influence models is 
given. The models are presented in a formalized form, together with the algorithms 
involved. 
 
The assumptions are the ones in Chapter 2 of this paper. Let us recall a few major 
points, and make several considerations regarding the models’. 
 
The first, and probably the most important aspect to be kept in mind is that the 
models’ focus is on effects seen as concepts. The simulation’s target value is the 
generic capability of service providing, and we talk about the influence propagation 
based on more or less subjective considerations, and not on real physical or 
engineering laws. The physical cause of the error is not considered –  what matters is 
how a component incapability affects the related components’ capability. 
 
The models are inspired mainly by two major conceptual frameworks: the perceptron 
model for neural networks, and the fuzzy cognitive maps. According to the first, the 
system can be seen as an interconnected network of neurons (components). Unlike 
the perceptron model, our ‘neuron’ can have more outputs (axons). The system is 
fully functional when all the neurons are on the zero excitation level. The failure of 
service providing of a component corresponds to an increase in the excitation level of 
the correspondent neuron. The entire network is affected by this, through the 
propagation of the signal from the source neuron to the connected ones. The level of 
excitation of the last affected neurons is given by the activation function. The last 
activated neurons affect in turn the neurons related to them, and so on. The process 
continues until all the neurons are reached, or the excitation signal is damped. The 
network excitation level is determined by the neurons levels, this corresponding to 
the system operability state. 
 
 
3.1. System Definition 
 
Consider a system S defined as a non-weighted, non-oriented graph  
 
 ),( EVGS = , (3.1.1) 
 
with V the set of S’s nodes, and E the set of edges. The following hold:    
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 ( ){ }jiVvVvvvE jiji ≠∈∈= ,,|,   (3.1.2) 
 [ ]2VE ⊆  (3.1.3) 
 
The elements of V correspond to the system components, and E reflects the 
connectivity between the components. We will refer to S as the system’s graph. 
 
The system’s graph is non-oriented, because it is assumed that two components can 
affect each other regardless the direction of influence. In other words, the influence 
flow is bi-directional. 
 
Example 
 
Let us consider the system S in Fig. 3.2. The system will be used throughout this 
chapter to illustrate the concepts, for a better understanding of the models.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 System representation 
 
The system has 7 components. The interconnections between the components are 
the edges of the graph. Analytically, the system is defined as: 
 
S=G(V,G) { }7,6,5,4,3,2,1=V  (3.1.4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }6,7,6,5,7,4,6,4,5,3,4,3,3,2,2,1=E  
 
 
3.2. The Classification of System Components 
 
As indicated before, the components are grouped in classes with regard to their 
functionality, design, or any other classification criteria. We will denote the classes as 
Ci , ni ..1= , and n – the number of classes. 
 
In the context, jvC i =)(  means that component )(SVvi ∈  belongs to class j. 
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Example (continued) 
 
Consider that the components of system S are grouped in two categories, CIRCLE 
and SQUARE. Components {2,4,5} are SQUARE-type and components {1,3,6,7} are 
CIRCLE-type. 
 
 C1 = CIRCLE 
 C2 = SSQUARE 
 
The system graph is modified to illustrate the components classification (Fig. 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3 (a) The System graph 
 
The components are renumbered in consideration of their class. 
 
 
3.3. The Influence Intensity 
 
It is assumed that the intensity of influence of two components depends on the 
parent classes. This is the expression of the idea that different types of components 
would differently affect each other from the functionality point of view. Moreover, 
depending on where the influence is coming from (incoming direction of influence) 
the levels of interaction between objects of two classes can be different.  
 
The analytical expression of this is the influence weights matrix, with the influencing 
components as lines, and the influenced components as columns. This is a square 
matrix, with the number of lines equal with the number of system classes. 
 
Let wCiCj (with Ci the influential class, and Cj the influenced class) be the influence 
weights. The following hold:  
 
i) 10 ≤≤
jiCC
w , where 
ii) wCiCj = 0, meaning that components from class Ci do not affect whatsoever the 
components in Cj. 
iii) wCiCj = 1, meaning that components from class Ci totally affect the components in 
Cj. 
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Usually, the Influence Weights Matrix (IWM) is not symmetrical, and the diagonal 
elements are 1 (components from the same class are totally interconnected). 
 
Some remarks would help in a better understanding of the concept. The influence 
here reflects how the functional incapability of one component affects the capability 
of the component(s) directly related to it, by passing on part (or all) of the failure. This 
could be seen as the propagation of the failure. 
 
On the other hand, wij (i) cannot be negative, because when taking the effect as a 
concept, one cannot conceive that diminishing the capability in one component would 
result in an increase in the capability of other component and, (ii) cannot be higher 
than 1 because, in this approach, the propagated error cannot be higher than the 
initial one. 
 
 
Example (continued) 
 
For the considered case IWM is a two-by-two squared matrix, and assuming that the 
components fully influence each other regardless the parent classes one has 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
11
11
IWF  
 
 
3.4. Quantification and Classification of Error 
 
The system is analyzed on two levels: first, on the components level, and second on 
the overall system functionality. The first provides information regarding the health 
status of each of the system components, and the analytical expression is the 
Incapability Index. The second is based on the operability status of all the system 
components, and provides information regarding (i) the level of dispersion of the error 
within the system, and (ii) the severity of the error (how much an error affects the 
overall operability of the system). The severity of the error is expressed by the 
Infrastructure Failure Index and the Weighted Infrastructure Failure Index quantities. 
 
Definition of Incapability Index 
 
We introduce the Incapability Index (II) as a measure of a system component's 
capability of service providing. In fact, II is the one-complement of the component 
functionality (capability of service providing). II of a component vi is defined as  
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1)(0
state service' of denial'  totalain  iscomponent   theif 1,
service  theprovidesfully component   theif ,0
)(
≤≤
⎩⎨
⎧=
i
i
vII
vII
     (3.4.1) 
 
For instance, a value of II(vi) = 0.2 means that component vi only provides 80% of the 
service.  
 
The rationale behind taking II within the [0,1] interval is that, as indicated before, this 
model focuses on effect and the effects propagation – influence flow, seen as failure 
of service providing, as opposed to the cause-effect process simulation. 
 
Based on the value of its II, a system component is said to be in either one out of  
three operability states: Fully Functional, Partially Disabled, or Out of Order. The 
classification is made according to two threshold limits, as follows: 
 
  
1)( if Order, ofOut 
)( if Disabled,Partially 
)(0 if ,FunctionalFully 
 is 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<<
<=<
<=<
i
i
i
i
vIISTL
STLvIIITL
ITLvII
v  (3.4.2) 
 
where  
 
)(SVvi ∈  - system component i 
II - Incapability Index 
ITL - Inferior Threshold Limit 
STL - Superior Threshold Limit 
 
A pertinent question may arise: why explicitly include in the classification the Fully 
Functional level? The answer relates to what ‘Fully Functional’  means, namely that 
even if the error level is negligible for the respective component, the component is, 
however, touched by the error. This is also reflected in (3.4.2) by the strict order 
relationship defining the Fully Functional state.  
 
Given the system ),( EVGS =  we define: 
 
FF
S  the number of elements of V that are Fully Functional; 
PD
S  the number of elements of V that are Partially Disabled; 
OO
S  the number of elements of V that are Out of Order; 
 
The following stands true: 
 
• SSSS
OOPDFF
≤++ , with S  the system’s graph order; 
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• the number ( )
OOPDFF
SSS ++  represents how many system components 
are influenced, while 
• ( )
OOPDFF
SSSS ++−  returns the number of components unaffected by 
the error. 
 
If II(vi) > 0, we will say that vi is reached by the error. 
 
 
Definition of Infrastructure Failure Index and Weighted Infrastructure Failure 
Index 
The Infrastructure Failure Index (IFI) and the Weighted Infrastructure Failure Index 
(WIFI), are defined as alternative, and equally useful, measures of the failure at the 
system level. IFI is computed as the total number of system components that are at 
least reached by the error, divided by the total number of system components, as 
follows: 
 
S
SSS
SIFI OOPDFF
++=)(  ,   (3.4.3) 
where 
 
 
FF
S , 
FF
S , 
FF
S  and S  are defined in the previous paragraph. 
 
The Weighted Infrastructure Failure Index is computed using the importance weights 
that characterize each of the functional conditions of the components, by the 
equation: 
 
( )
OOOOPDPDFFFF
SwSwSw
S
SWIFI ***1)( ++=  , (3.4.4) 
where 
 
 wFF - importance weight for Fully Functional; 
 wPD - importance weight for Partially Disabled; 
 wOO - importance weight for Out of Order; 
 
Equations (3.4.3) and (3.4.4) are different from the point of view of their meaning. 
While IFI represents the level of dispersion of the error within the system (how many 
components are affected by the error), WIFI is a measure of severity of the error at 
the system level (how much damage the error did to the system). 
 
From the formulae for IFI and WIFI it follows that: 
 
i) 1)(0 ≤≤ SIFI  ;  
ii)    )()( SWIFISIFI ≥ ; (3.4.5) 
iii) )()( SWIFISIFI = , for 1=== OOPDFF www  
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We introduce Infrastructure Failure, denoted IF as a means of the system overall 
operability state. IF classification is made with regard to three acceptability intervals: 
Acceptable, Partially Acceptable or Unacceptable. Accordingly, the value of IFI or 
WIFI are as follows: 
 
  
1)( if Order, ofOut 
)( if Disabled,Partially 
)(0 if ,Acceptable
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<<
<=<
<=<
=
WIFIIFISTL
STLWIFIIFIITL
ITLWIFIIFI
IF , (3.4.6) 
where 
 
IFI - Infrastructure Failure Index; 
WIFI - Weighted Infrastructure Failure Index; 
ITL - Inferior Threshold Limit; 
STL - Superior Threshold Limit. 
 
Some remarks are in order:  
 
The threshold limits (ITL and STL) in (3.4.6) are considered system-defined 
quantities. This means that the components are not differently classified with regard 
to the class they belong to.  
 
ITL and STL are adjustable to reflect the risk perception. This approach is also 
reflected in Weighted Infrastructure Index computation. The importance weights 
reflect how different operability states of the system components are perceived by 
the analyst. This depends on many factors, such as the analyzed system, geo-
political environment, development level of the area considered, safety culture, etc. 
 
 
3.5 Error Generation and Influence Flows 
 
First, let us recall some basic assumptions regarding the error generation and 
dispersion. An error is considered a component’s loss of the capability of service 
providing. This is reflected by a value of component’s II higher than 0. As mentioned, 
the error is generated at an Error Injection Point. 
 
Loosing part of functionality, the affected component influences (or not) the 
components it interacts with. The influence is quantified by a loss of capability of the 
respective components (increase of II), and is modulated by the influencing– 
influenced interaction characteristics, given by the influence weights. The newly 
influenced components continue to spread the error out to the connected 
components. The process continues until the system boundaries are reached (all the 
components are influenced) or the error is damped. 
 
It is said that components affected in one influence propagation step - as presented 
above - belong to the same influence level. The whole process describes the 
influence flow. One can see that the influence flow is characteristic to the error 
injection point. 
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The influence flow is considered a non-recursive process. Moreover, the error is 
spreading from one influence level to the next simultaneously and omni-directionally. 
As a consequence, a component can only be influenced once by the error coming 
from the influencing component(s). 
 
Every EIP injects its contribution of error which, at the components level, is summed 
up. The operability of a system characterized by a distribution of EIP’s is affected by 
the operability of its components. 
 
Discussion: One can also look at the influence flow assumptions approach from 
a wave propagation perspective. The process of error generation, 
propagation and accumulation at the component’s level from this 
viewpoint is presented in Fig.3.4. One has here a system with 27 
components. The interconnections between the components are not 
displayed, since they are no relevant in this case. The number of 
system classes is also not important. The components are 
distributed accordingly to their relationship with the error sources 
and interconnectivities between them.  
 
Three of the components are defined as Error Injection Points (EIP 
1, EIP 2, EIP 3). The influence levels are represented as circles 
(donuts), centered on the respective EIPs.   
 
For each EIP, the components on level i are directly affected by the 
component(s) from level (i -1) and affect the components from level 
(i +1). If a component falls inside the intersection between the 
influence areas of two or more EIPs, the total effect at the 
component level is the sum of all contributions from the respective 
EIPs. 
 
The system state can be described as: 
 
 
EIP 
 
 
Influence 
Levels 
 
 
Affected Components per 
Influence Level 
L11 1 
L12 4 
L13 1 
EIP 1 4 
L14 2 
L21 1 
L22 1 
L23 2 
EIP 2 4 
L24 3 
L31 2 
L32 4 EIP 3 3 
L33 1 
 
where Lij is the EIP i 's influence level j. 
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There are three components affected both by EIP 1 and  EIP 2. The 
Incapability Index for these components is computed as: 
 
IISC1 = IISC1(L12) + IISC1(L21) 
IISC2 = IISC2(L12) + IISC2(L21) 
IISC3 = IISC3(L14) + IISC3(L23) 
where 
 
 IISC(Lij) - the Incapability Index generated by EIP i at level j. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (a) Wave-type error propagation 
 
Summarizing, the influence flows through the system starting from an EIP following 
routes defined based on the connectivity between the components. We introduce 
)','( EVGI
Δ=  referred to as error injection graph (EIG) or influence flow graph, the 
graph characterizing the error flow process.  I is a weighted and oriented sub-graph 
of the system graph S. 
 
)','( EVGI
Δ=  (3.5.1) 
with  
 
VV ⊆' ,  { }))(),((,,','|),,(' '''''' jijiji vvCIWMwjiVvVvwvvE =≠∈∈=  
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The weight moderating the interaction between the classes of the influencing and 
influenced components is attached to each edge of the EIG. v’i is the influencing 
component, and v’j is the influenced component.  
 
The flow direction is given by the sequence v’I – v’j.  
 
In other words, the triple ),,( '' wvv ji  defining an edge should read as: 
 
‘Component v’i with II(v’i) influences the component v’j, this being reflected in 
a change in the incapability index of the last one, function of w.’ 
 
or 
 
‘A percent w of the error of v’i  ‘goes’ to v’j.’  
 
The Error Injection Graph is built based on the system graph through an iterative 
process that can be summarized in a parent – kid approach as:  
 
Starting from the EIP component as kid, declare the kids determined in the 
last step as parents and get the new parents’ kids until no kids are found. 
 
We denote L as the influence level and say that avL i =)( means that component vi is 
on level a of influence. 
 
The error injection graph generation algorithm is presented in the sequel. 
 
 Algorithm 3.1 
S0 Initialize components 
              }{' ovV =  , 0)( 0 =vIL  
              ∅='E  
              0=cStep  
S1 While StopCondition = FALSE repeat steps 2 to 8 
 S2 For each node 'Vvi ∈  with cStepvIL i =)(  
  S3 Get )( iS vN , the set of all neighbors of vi from S 
  S4 For each )( iSj vNv ∈ , )(,1 ivdj =  repeat steps 5 to 6 
   S5 if { } ', Evv ij ∈  jump to STEP 7 
   S6 Update the EIG and set vj  
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{ }
( ) ( )( )
{ }
1)(
,,''
,
''
+=
∪=
=
∪=
cStepvIL
wvvEE
vCvCIWMw
vVV
j
ji
ji
j
 
 S7 cStep = cStep + 1 
 S8 Verify StopCondition 
            ⎩⎨
⎧
∅<>
∅==
  if  ,
 if  ,
XFALSE
XTRUE
ionStopCondit , where 
            { }cStepxILVxX ii =∈= )(|'  
 
 
 
Discussion: The set V’ of the error injection graph is initialized with 
one element, which is the error origin, the EIP.  Step S5 ensures 
that the model influence propagation condition is fulfilled. 
 
 
Important information for characterizing system's comparative vulnerability to errors 
occurring at different components can be extracted from the error injection graph. 
Thus, one finds: 
 
• The number of influence levels required for the error generated by an EIP to 
maximize its effect on the system (maximum cover over the system), is 
given by  
 ( )( )'max ii vIL  ,   )'(..1 Vdi =  (3.5.2) 
 
• Which is (are) the level(s) in which the highest number of components are 
simultaneously affected, and which are the influential and influenced  
components: 
 
A relevant information can also be extracted from the error injection graph: the 
influence paths corresponding to the error flow from an error injection point to a 
component. 
 
Example (continued) 
 
Let us consider three error injection points for the system S, namely C1, S3 and C3. 
The error injection graphs are obtained by applying Algorithm 1 for each of the 
considered EIPs. We denote IC1(V’C1, E’C1), IS3(V’S3, E’S3), IC3(V’C3, E’C3)  the injection 
graphs associated to C1, S3 and C3, respectively. 
 
The definition of IC1, IS3, IC3  is presented in Table 3.1 : 
  
Chapter 3 – The Models.  Formalism  
The Influence Paths InSIEME  
 
 
 23 
 
 
EIP EIG Structure Maximum Influence Levels 
C1 I C1 
{ }34232111 ,,,,,,' CCSSCSCV C =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}1,,,5,1,,,4,1,,,4,1,,,4
,1,,,3,1,,,3,1,,,2,1,,,1'
34323343
22322111
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCE =
 
5 
S3 I S1 
{ }11223433 ,,,,,,' CSSCCCSV S =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}1,,,3,1,,,2,1,,,2,1,,,2
,1,,,2,1,,,1,1,,,1,1,,,1'
11221223
34233343
CSSCSCSC
CCCSCSCSE =
 
3 
C3 I C3 
{ }11224333 ,,,,,,' CSCSCSCV C =  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}1,,,4,1,,,3,1,,,2,1,,,2
,1,,,2,1,,,1,1,,,1,1,,,1'
11122223
43234343
CSSCCSCS
CSSCCCSCE =
 
4 
 
Table 3.1 
 
The EIPs, with the associated error injection graphs are presented in Fig. 3.5 (a), (b), 
(c). The error injection points are depicted in red and the influence flow is 
represented by the directed edges of the graphs. The numbers associated to the 
graph edges are the influence levels. 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) (c) 
 
Figure 3.5 Error injection points and associated graphs 
 
 
One can see that, from the overall system error coverage viewpoint, the same 
system can be differently influenced by a perturbation depending on the initial 
affected component localization. More precisely, the number of influence steps 
required by the error to affect all the system components depends on the system 
connectivity. In our case, we can say that component S3 is the most critical in the 
process of error propagation. 
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3.6 The Influence Paths 
 
Another useful information can be extracted from the error injection graphs: which 
are the paths followed by the error generated by an EIP to reach a component?  
 
As indicated, the influence of an error injection point flows through the system by 
propagating from the source (the EIP) in all directions, following the interconnections 
between the system’s components. 
 
We define the Error Injection Path or Route as the sequence of components 
influenced (touched by) an error generated by an EIP to reach a component from the 
EIP graph. Based on system’s interconnections, there can be more than one route 
connecting the error injection point (the source) to a component (the destination). We 
will refer to all the routes connecting an EIP to a component as to Error Injection 
Routes (Paths). 
 
We denote: 
 
P (xs,xd)  – the error injection paths connecting xs  
(the source) to xd (the destination). (3.6.1) 
 Pk(xs,xd) – the error injection path k connecting xs to xd. 
 
The following hold: 
 
 ( )sS xI  – error injection point defined in system S. (3.6.2) 
 ( )sSd xIx ∈  ( ) )(, sSds xIxxP ⊆  
( ) ( )U
k
dskds xxPxxP ,, =  
 
The above expresses that P (xi,xj) is a sub-graph of the error injection graph and 
each Pk (xi,xj) is a path-type sub-graph of P. 
 
From this, the sequence of determining the error injection routes appears natural: 
first, P is generated from the error injection graph; next, each route Pk is extracted 
from P.  
 
We define: 
 
 ( ) { }ids pxxP Δ=,  (3.6.3) 
 
with 
 
 { }lxcp ii ,,=  (3.6.4) 
 
where 
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 c – counts the influence levels; 
 ( ))( ssi xIVx ∈ ; 
 l – the position in P of pi ‘s influencing component. 
 
The l component will be used in the procedure to extract the individual routes from 
the paths graph. 
 
We also consider that for a path component pi like (3.6.4) one has: 
 
 
lpL
xpX
cpC
i
ii
i
=
=
=
)(
)(
)(
 (3.6.5) 
 
Once the error injection paths graph is built, the next phase is to separate each 
influence route Pk(vs,vd). 
 
We define: 
 
 ( ) { }kidsk pxxP Δ=,  (3.6.6) 
 
with 
 
 { }ii xp =  (3.6.7) 
 
where 
 
 ( ))( ssi xIVx ∈ . 
 
The number of distinct routes is given by the number of occurrences when the source 
component (vs) is encountered in P(vs,vd). The process is iterative and can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 Starting from vs, go to next route component in P(vs,vd) until vd is reached.  
 
The next route component is given by the position in the routes set of the parent 
component – L(vi), where vi is the current component. 
 
The Algorithm 
 
A. Construction of error injection paths graph P 
 
Several preliminary remarks are in order: 
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1) From the error injection graph structure, as well as from the general influence rule 
adopted for this model, one can see that a component can be reached in different 
influence steps within the error injection graph. 
2) The algorithm used for construction of the error injection paths graph is bottom-up 
type, which means that the graph is built starting from destination and ending to 
the start point (the error injection point). 
 
 
 Algorithm 3.2 
S0 Initialize  
 { }1,,00 −= vdp  
 { }0pP =  
 c = 0 
S1 While StopCondition = FALSE repeat steps 2 to 5 
 S2 c=c+1 
 S3 For each node Ppi ∈  with 1)( −= cpC i  
  S4 Get X from ( ) ( )ixI pXE sS , , the set of all neighbors of pi 
from the error injection graph )( sS xI  
  S5 For each Xx j ∈ , )(,1 ipdj =  repeat S6  
   S6 { })(,, ij pLxcPP ∪=  
S7 Verify StopCondition 
            ⎩⎨
⎧
∅<>
∅==
  if  ,
 if  ,
XFALSE
XTRUE
ionStopCondit  
 
 
B. Extraction of individual routes Pk 
 
We introduce an additional set SL defined as: 
 { }{ }}{),(|)( sdsiiL xvvPppLS ∩∈=  (3.6.8) 
 
Equation (3.6.8) express that SL’s elements are the position in P(vs,vd) where vs is 
encountered. LS  gives the number of distinct routes connecting vs to vd. SL will be 
used as starting point in the iterative process of isolating the distinctive paths from 
P(vs,vd). 
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 Algorithm 3.3 
S0 Initialize 
   Get SL from P(vs,vd); k=0 
S1 For each LScPos∈  repeat steps S2 to S6 
 S2 k=k+1 
 S2 Initialize route 
    ∅=kP  
 S3 While StopCondition = FALSE repeat steps S4 to S6 
  S4 ( ){ }cPosPPP kk ∪=  
  S5 ( )( )cPosPLcPos =  
 S6 Verify StopCondition 
            ⎩⎨
⎧
≠
==
 -1Pos if  ,
-1Pos if  ,
cFALSE
cTRUE
ionStopCondit  
 
 
Example (continued) 
 
Let us consider the error injection point EIPC1 as in the previous section. We want to 
determine all the paths the error generated by EIPC1 follows to reach C3. Accordingly, 
we will have xs = C1, xd = C3. 
 
Applying Algorithm 3.3, one gets: 
 
( ) { } { } { } { } { } { } { }{ } { } { } { } { } { } { } ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −=
12,,5,9,,4,8,,4,7,,4,6,,3,5,,3,4,,3
,3,,2,2,,2,1,,2,0,,1,0,,1,0,,1,1,,0
,
1111211
3224233
31 CSCCCSS
SCCCSSC
CCP  
 
Analyzing P1(C1,C3) one can see that the error injection point (C1) is reached three 
times. This means that there are three distinct routes from C1 to C3. On the other 
hand, once a split-point is encountered by the error, the error flow is tracked-down for 
each of the branches, regardless of any eventual junction encountered next. 
 
Applying Algorithm 3.3 the following routes are extracted from P(C1,C3): 
 ( ) { }343211311 ,,,,,, CCSCSCCCP =  ( ) { }32211312 ,,,,, CSCSCCCP =  ( ) { }33211313 ,,,,, CSCSCCCP =  
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Figure 3.6 represents the error injection paths graph (a) and the error routes (b), (c), 
(d) for the considered example. The direction of the arches in case (a) reflects the 
generation direction. The numbers attached to each arc shows the generation steps. 
 
 
  
(a) 
 (b) 
  
 
(c) (d) 
 
Figure 3.6  
 (a) The influence paths graph P(C1,C3); (b) Error route 1 P1(C1,C3); 
(c) Error route 2 P2(C1,C3); (d) Error route 3 P3(C1,C3)  
 
 
3.7 The Error Dispersion and the Influence Flow Simulation 
 
The two proposed simulation models aim at supporting the evaluation of system’s 
complexity-induced vulnerability.  
A static approach for simulating the influence-induced error propagation is taken for 
the Error Dispersion model, while in the Influence Flow model a dynamic approach is 
adopted.  
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Both models share the same assumptions on the error propagation (influence flow) 
presented in this chapter. To recall, it is assumed that the error starts from one 
component which becomes an error injection point. The error of the initial component 
influences the connected components which, in turn, become error sources for the 
next connected components. The error follows the error injection routes hold by the 
influence flow graph. 
 
The simulation is comprised of two distinct phases:  
1. Determine the propagation of error within each error injection graph. 
2. Update the system components’ II based on the contributions from each of the 
EIPs – if any. 
 
We will refer to the first phase as updating the error injection graph, and to the 
second as updating the system components status. 
 
The induced incapability index of the destination node is added to each edge of the 
error injection graph. The edges set will be now: 
{ }))(),((,,','|),,,(' '''''' jijijiji vvCIWMwjiVvVvIIwvvE =≠∈∈= , (3.7.1) 
with IIji the incapability index of vj induced by vi.  
 
The induced incapability index is computed with the formula: 
ijiji wIIII *=  (3.7.2) 
 
 
3.7.1 The Error Dispersion Model – The Static Simulation 
 
The Error Dispersion model’s main goal is to express the operability pattern of the 
system, given a distribution of error injection points. In other words, the error 
dispersion model simulates how a distribution of error injection points affects the 
operability of the system’s components. 
 
The initial terms for the model are: 
 
 ),( EVGS =  the system; 
 )( iS vI , with niSVvi ..1),( =∈ ,  a number of n error injection points of S. 
 
We denote ))(( is vIII the incapability index (the error) injected in the system by the 
error injection point vi. 
 
 
Updating the Error Injection Graphs - The Algorithm  
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Given: IS(vs) = G(V’,E’) an error injection point of system S. 
 Algorithm 3.4 
S1 For each { } ))((,,, vIEIIwvve sjikjik ∈=   
with )(,..,1 SIEk =  
 S2 ( )∑= viXIIvII i ,)(  
 S3 
kii wvIIeII *)()( =  
 
The algorithm can be summarized as follows: compute the propagation of error on 
each edge of the influence flow graph starting from the source. The error of the 
influencing component is obtained from the edges pointing to that component.  
 
Since (i) a component can be reached several times on different paths of the same 
error injection graph and (ii) the error propagation is considered for each edge, the 
sum of all the incoming errors for the influencing component should be performed 
before computing the error passed to the influenced component (step S2). 
 
The edge set of the influence flow graph is scanned from the error source (top-down) 
towards the graph bounding. The order edges are added to E(I) (Alg. 3.4) ensures 
that for an edge (vi,vj) there is at least one edge (vk,vi) previously encountered, which 
means that the incapability index of vi is already computed. 
 
From the influence direction point of view, we can say that the error propagation is 
computed from the influencing component towards the influenced one. In other 
words, the computation is performed from the influencing component perspective. 
 
Updating the System’s Components Status – The Algorithm 
 
The updating of the system’s components status consists in computing the 
incapability index of all the system components, based on the error induced by each 
of the error injection points.  
 
The influence composition rule is simply additive. The computation is made first 
within the error injection path, and then the result is transferred to the component. 
Even though this leads to an increased complexity of the algorithm, this approach 
proves useful from the computational time viewpoint in the case of large systems 
containing one or more subsystems.   
 
The algorithm is presented in the sequel. 
 
 Algorithm 3.5 
S0 Clear the system nodes 
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    0)( =ivII , )(SVvi ∈ , ||,..,1 Si =  
 S1 For each error injection graph ISl repeat steps S2 to S6 
  S2 For each { } )(,,, isjikjik IEIIwvve ∈= with )(,..,1 iSIEk =  
   S3 if vj marked go to step S2; else 
   S4 ( )∑= jvXIIII ,  
   
S5 
Update the value of the II of system component 
corresponding to vj 
 
IIvIIvII mm += )()( , where )(SVvm ∈ , jm vv ≅  
   S6 Mark vj 
 
 
The Error Dispersion Simulation 
 
The algorithm for the error dispersion simulation is: 
 
 
 Algorithm 3.6 
S0 
Initialize System state: 
- Define the error injection points; 
- Set the error intensity (II) for each of the error 
injection points. 
S1 Compute the error dispersion along each error injection graph    - execute Algorithm x for each error injection point. 
S2 Update the system components    - execute Algorithm xx. 
 
 
Example (continued) 
 
Consider the system S, and the error injection point C1. For an incapability index 
2.0)( 1 =CII , the following results are obtained for (i) the error injection graph edges 
and (ii) the component’s operability state: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}2.0,1,,,5,2.0,1,,,4,2.0,1,,,4,2.0,1,,,4
,2.0,1,,,3,2.0,1,,,3,2.0,1,,,2,2.0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
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Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.2 
S1 0.2 
C2 0.2 
S2 0.2 
S3 0.2 
C3 0.6 
V(S) 
C4 0.2 
 
The amplification effect occurring in junction-encountering cases is visible in this 
example. Component’s C3 incapability index is 0.6, even though the error injected by 
C1 is 0.2. The reason is that C3 accumulate the influence from three sources, 
respectively S2, S3 and C4. 
 
 
3.7.2 The Influence Flow Model – The Dynamic Simulation 
 
The influence flow model allows tracking the error propagation on a step-by-step 
basis (one influence level at a time). In other words, the model allows the 
visualization of the error flow throughout the system. 
 
We define the time step, or simulation step, the time the errors go from one influence 
level to the next one. The dynamic simulation is quantified in time steps. One can 
say that in the dynamic simulation each computational step handles only the 
propagation of error during one time unit.  
 
Moreover, the error injection points’ failure intensities, are not stationary during the 
simulation (the II of the EIP is function of time), thus giving a high flexibility in 
simulating complex scenarios. The number of the system’s error injection points can 
also vary in time. For instance, the simulation can start with five error injection points, 
then after several simulation steps some more EIPs may be added to the system 
while two of the initial ones may be removed. During all these, the values for the 
EIPs may vary in time. 
 
As mentioned, an error injection point’s incapability index is a function of time. To 
represent this, we introduce the Trend, denoted T, which characterizes the EIP 
evolution in time. We will have: 
 
 tvI
t
i
t
i i
TvIIIvIII )(
1))(())(( += −  (3.7.2.1)
  
where 
 
- tivIII ))((  is the incapability index of error injection point vi at simulation time t; 
- 1))(( −tivIII  is the incapability index of error injection point vi at simulation time 
1−t ; and 
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- tvI iT )(  is the trend of the error injection point at time t. 
 
If we denote tS  the system state at moment t, one can say that 
 
 ( ))(,1 ittt vISS −  (3.7.2.2) 
 
which means that the system state at moment t depends of the system state at 
moment  t-1 and the error injection points at moment t. 
 
Generally, the dynamic model is used to evaluate the system response and behavior 
with respect to different evolution, distribution and intensities of the errors. 
 
Updating the Error Injection Graphs - The Algorithm  
 
The dynamic behavior is given by the direction of updating the error injection graphs.  
Unlike with the static model, here the update procedure is bottom-up. The error 
propagation is computed from the influenced component perspective. In other words, 
the influenced component is the main actor and it gets all the error contributions from 
its influencing components. 
 
Consider the influence flow graph at moment t, and the position of the current 
updated component (vi) denoted by p. The following remark is of utmost importance 
in understanding this algorithm: all the components above the current one are 
characterized by the incapability index at moment (t-1). Following this, the 
incapability index of the current component at moment t is computed with regard to 
the values of the incapability indices of its influencing components at (t-1). Moreover, 
due to the fact that an influencing component can be reached on different influence 
levels, only the influencing components from the influence level prior to the current 
one are taken into account. 
 
The algorithm for updating an error influence flow graph is described in the sequel. 
 
Given: IS(vs) = G(V’,E’) an error injection point of system S, and T the error variation 
trend. 
 
 
 Algorithm 3.7 
S1 For each { } ))((,,,, vIEIIwvvle sjikjikk ∈=   
with 1..)( SIEk =  
repeat steps S2 and S3 
 S2 Compute the error contribution of the influencing 
components at moment (t-1) 
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( )∑ −− = viXIIvII tit ,)( )1()1(  
where 
 { } { }( ){ }kilill lvxILvxxX <∈= ,|,  
 S3 Compute the error of the influenced component at moment 
(t) 
ki
t
j
t
i
t wvIIvIIeII *)()()( )1()( −==  
S4 Update the error injection point’s incapability index 
 
TvIIvII s
t
s
t += − )()( )1()(  
 
 
Updating the System Components Status – The Algorithm 
 
The algorithm for updating the system’s components is similar to Algorithm 3.5 
presented in Section 3.7.1. 
 
The Influence Flow Simulation 
 
The algorithm for one influence flow simulation step is: 
 
 Algorithm 3.8 
S0 
Initialize System state: 
- Modify the error injection points (optional); 
- Modify the error intensity trends (T) for each of the 
error injection points (optional). 
S1 
Compute the error dispersion at moment t along each error 
injection graph with regard to the error dispersion at moment 
(t-1) 
   - execute Algorithm x for each error injection point. 
S2 Update the system components    - execute Algorithm xx. 
 
 
Example (continued) 
 
Consider the system S, and the error injection point C1.  
 
The incapability index of C1 will have the following time evolution, according to the 
trend T(C1): 
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T(C1) 
Duration 
(simulation steps) II(C1) evolution 
0.3 2 0 – 0.6 
-0.6 1 0.6 – 0 
 
This simulates a ramp-shaped error for two time steps, followed by an immediate 
recovery of the error source component. The simulation will continue until the effects 
of the initial failure vanish from the system. 
 
The following results are obtained:  
 
Results after simulation step 1 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}0,1,,,5,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4
,0,1,,,3,0,1,,,3,0,1,,,2,0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)1(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.3 
S1 0.0 
C2 0.0 
S2 0.0 
S3 0.0 
C3 0.0 
V(S(0)) 
C4 0.0  
 
Results after simulation step 2 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}0,1,,,5,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4
,0,1,,,3,0,1,,,3,0,1,,,2,3.0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)2(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.6 
S1 0.3 
C2 0.0 
S2 0.0 
S3 0.0 
C3 0.0 
V(S(2)) 
C4 0.0  
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Results after simulation step 3 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}0,1,,,5,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4
,0,1,,,3,0,1,,,3,3.0,1,,,2,6.0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)3(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.0 
S1 0.6 
C2 0.3 
S2 0.0 
S3 0.0 
C3 0.0 
V(S(3)) 
C4 0.0  
 
Results after simulation step 4 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}0,1,,,5,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4
,3.0,1,,,3,3.0,1,,,3,6.0,1,,,2,0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)4(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.0 
S1 0.0 
C2 0.6 
S2 0.3 
S3 0.3 
C3 0.0 
V(S(4)) 
C4 0.0  
 
Results after simulation step 5 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}0,1,,,5,3.0,1,,,4,3.0,1,,,4,3.0,1,,,4
,6.0,1,,,3,6.0,1,,,3,0,1,,,2,0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)5(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.0 
S1 0.0 
C2 0.0 
S2 0.6 
S3 0.6 
C3 0.6 
V(S(5)) 
C4 0.3  
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Results after simulation step 6 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}3.0,1,,,5,6.0,1,,,4,6.0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4
,0,1,,,3,6.0,1,,,3,0,1,,,2,0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)6(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.0 
S1 0.0 
C2 0.0 
S2 0.0 
S3 0.0 
C3 1.0 
V(S(6)) 
C4 0.6  
 
Results after simulation step 7 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}6.0,1,,,5,0,1,,,4,0,1,,,4,6.0,1,,,4
,0,1,,,3,6.0,1,,,3,0,1,,,2,0,1,,,1
34323343
223221111
)7(
CCCSCSCS
SCSCCSSCCIE S =  
 
Component Incapability Index 
C1 0.0 
S1 0.0 
C2 0.0 
S2 0.0 
S3 0.0 
C3 0.6 
V(S(7)) 
C4 0.0  
 
After simulation step 8, all the components are back in line, as fully operational and 
unaffected by error. 
 
In the pictures above, the black components are the ones unaffected by error, the 
yellow ones have an incapability index lower than 0.5 and the red ones have an 
incapability index higher than 0.5.  
 
Another interesting result obtained by using the dynamic model is also reflected in 
this example. It concerns what can be termed as a wave effect in error propagation. 
One can see, when analyzing the results in a step-by-step manner, that even though 
the error generating component is back to the fully functional state (it does no longer 
injects any error through the system), the already generated failure continues to 
propagate itself, following the initial pattern of the error generated by the EIP. 
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InSIEME – The Application 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 System Requirements 
 
InSIEME is developed on ESRI’s ArcView®  3.3 GIS platform, as a CRISA project. 
The application was also tested on previous versions of ArcView with partially 
successful  results. The current version is design to work only under Microsoft® 
Windows™ operating systems. 
 
The infrastructure system considered is the Italian 360 KW power grid. The focus is 
on electricity generation and transportation networks. 
 
4.2 Application Framework 
 
This section presents the InSIEME framework, focusing on the typical workflow, and 
presenting elements of user-interface and utilization guidelines. Details regarding the 
implementation of the models in Chapter 3 are also given. 
 
A certain level of proficiency with ArcView is a prerequisite. 
 
A correspondence between InSIEME systems and ArcView native objects should be 
established. A list of the InSIEME system structural components and their 
correspondent ArcView objects is given in the sequel. 
 
 InSIEME System  ArcView GIS 
1 Primary data source The Project 
2 Component Theme Feature 
3 Component type (class) 
Theme  
Only themes characterized by 
‘Feature Data Source Type’ 
 
InSIEME provides a collection of tools for (i) System definition (construction) and (ii) 
System analysis. All the tools can be accessed from the System Analyst Gateway. 
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Figure 4.1. The System Analyst Gateway 
 
From The Gateway the following can be started: 
 
• System Definition – for the management of the system structural definition. 
• Global System Representation – for generating the global representation of the 
current system (details - later on in this chapter). 
• Infrastructure Failure Index & Infrastructure Classification Levels and System 
Components Functionality Classification Levels – for the management of the risk 
levels. 
• Error Injection Points – for the management of the system’s error injection points. 
• Static Simulation – for initiating an error dispersion simulation session. 
• Dynamic Simulation – for initiating an influence flow simulation session. 
 
 
4.2.1 Building a System 
 
As indicated, an InSIEME system is built starting from the GIS representation of the 
infrastructure. The GIS representation is a collection of ArcView themes. Each theme 
is an InSIEME component-type class. The theme’s features are the system 
components. 
 
Building a system involves several steps presented here from both perspectives, 
InSIEME and ArcView respectively:  
 
1. (InSIEME) Define the system components’ classes.  
(ArcView) Select the themes relevant to the infrastructure system.  
 
2. (InSIEME) Establish the influence intensity weights of  the defined classes.  
(ArcView) None.  
 
3. (InSIEME) Define the system by the interconnections between components.  
(ArcView) Select the features (pairwise) based on the interconnections.  
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InSIEME holds the system definition information in three files, corresponding to each 
of the steps above. 
 
The System Definition File (*.sdf) – contains the system classes. The name of the 
class will be referred to as the key. The ArcView theme corresponding to the 
class is represented by the theme data source (the shape (shp)  file). 
 
The advantage of this representation is that the system classes are correctly 
defined irrespective of the ArcView theme names. In other words, one can 
change the name of the themes in the view, but this action should not be 
reflected in the system definition. 
 
The Interconnections Weight File (*.iwf) – holds the weights characterizing the 
influence level between the classes.  
 
The System Interconnections File (*.sif) – holds the pairs of interconnected 
components. The sif  file is in fact the one defining the system, since the InSIEME 
system is basically characterized by the interconnection pattern between the 
components. 
 
The following is worth noticing: an InSIEME system component is referenced by its 
parent class and the index of the corresponding ArcView feature 
 
The advantage of modularizing the system definition is that this approach confers a 
greater flexibility of the systems construction processes. For instance, for the same 
data sources (shape files) one can define several sub-systems with regard to the 
interconnection between the components, or the number of relevant components. In 
this case, the sdf and iwf files would be the same, only the sif files having to be built 
for each of the subsystems. 
 
Building a system - How to… 
 
1. From The Analyst Gateway launch System Definition Manager (Fig. 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The System Definition Manager dialog 
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2. Create the System Definition File 
 
2.1 Click  New button in System Definition File tab. The System Definition File 
Manager will pop-up (Fig. 4.3).  
 
2.2 Click  Add New Class button.  
 
2.2.1. Select the desired shape file (usually located in ‘\Shapes’ sub-folder of 
InSIEME folder). 
 
2.2.2. Provide the key (name)  for the new class.  
 
2.3 When done, click  Save button to save the sdf file.  
 
3. Create the Interconnections Weights File 
 
3.1 Click  New button in System Interconnections Weights File tab and provide 
a name for the iwf file. 
 
Figure 4.3.  New System Definition File dialog 
 
Note: Since the interconnections weights file is built based on the system definition 
file, ONE CANNOT CREATE a new iwf BEFORE selecting / creating the system’s 
definition file. 
 
3.2 Click  Edit button to change the default values for the interconnection 
influence levels. This is done from the Edit IW window (Fig. 4.4) 
 
3.3 When done, click  Save button to save the iwf file. 
 
 
  
Chapter 4 – InSIEME. The Application 
Application Framework InSIEME  
 
 
 42 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Edit IW dialog 
 
4. Create the System Interconnections File 
 
4.1 Click  New button in System Interconnections File tab and provide a name 
for the sif file. 
 
4.2 Click  Edit button to start the Edit SIF  window (Fig. 4.5) 
 
4.3  With the system view active, start building the pairs corresponding to the inter-
connected components. The components are selected from the system’s 
graphical representation using the selection tools . 
 
4.4 When done, click  Save button to save the sif file. 
 
Note: The selection tools  are used to provide data directly from the graphical 
representation of the system. For convenience, the selection tools pictogram is 
usually the same throughout the application. 
 
In strongly connected systems building the system interconnection file may prove to 
be a tricky job, due to the large number of interacting pairs. InSIEME provides two 
features to help the developer to trace the defined interconnections: the first is to 
highlight the components in the system view on a pair-by-pair basis. This is 
performed by checking the Highlight interconnection in system view box in the Edit 
SIF window. The effect is that, when a pair of components is selected in the 
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Figure 4.5. Edit System Interconnections File dialog 
 
 
interconnections list, the corresponding components are highlighted in the system 
view. The second is to highlight all the defined interconnections in the system view. 
Do this by clicking the Highlight interconnections button . 
 
 
4.2.2 Working Session 
 
A typical working session in InSIEME goes by three steps: 
 
1) Define the system  
2) Define the error injection points (the initial error distribution within the system) 
3) Analyze the system (run simulation and get the results) 
 
 
InSIEME provides the tools for each of the tasks above. 
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Figure 4.6. InSIEME workflow 
 
 
Define the system 
 
Defining the system implies (i) to select the system definition files describing the 
system to be analyzed, and (ii) to generate the Global System Representation for the 
current system. 
 
The definition files are selected from the System Definition Manager, by choosing 
Open   for each type of files. 
 
The Global System Representation (GSR) holds the system components and 
corresponds to the vertex set V of the system graph. The global system 
representation is built based on the data from the system interconnection file. In other 
words, the system definition process is backward: first, the system graph edges are 
defined (the interconnections); next, the nodes (system components) are extracted 
from the set of edges. This approach has been adopted in order to avoid resource 
overloading (e.g. add more components than necessary), as well as possible errors 
due to nodes–edges incompatibilities (e.g. edges that refer to nodes that do not 
exist). 
 
The Global System Representation is automatically built by InSIEME from the current 
system’s interconnections file. However, due to the considerable amount of time 
required by this procedure in the case of large systems, InSIEME provides the option 
of saving a GSR on disk. Three options are available when dealing with the GSR: 
 
• Generate new Global System Representation – the GSR is built based on the 
current sif file. This is the recommended option since the GSR is sure to be 
built error-proof from the edge-nodes compatibility viewpoint. 
• Select an already generated GSR – this should be used when a GSR was 
already generated and saved on disk. 
• Use the current GRS. 
  
Note: Attention should be exercised when selecting the system definition files. If 
there are incompatibilities between files (e.g. different class keys, sif files referencing 
components that do not exist in the ArcView themes, etc.) the simulation session will 
crash.  
 
 
Define the 
System 
 
1 
 
 
Define the Error 
Injection Points 
 
2 
 
 
Analyze 
the System 
 
3 
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Define the system – How to… 
 
Select the system definition files – from the System Definition Manager accessed 
from System Analyst Gateway. 
 
Generate / Select GSR 
 
1. Start Global System Representation from the System Definition Manager. 
 
2. Create / select the GSR from the possible options (Fig. 4.7). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. The Global System Representation selection dialog 
 
Define the error injection points 
 
Defining the error injection points implies to set the initial spatial distribution of EIPs 
within the system. As indicated, the simulation procedures deal with the system state, 
given a distribution of components that are not operating at the design level. 
 
The system’s EIPs can be managed either from a distinct management tool (Fig. 
4.8), or directly from within the simulation control window. Once an EIP is built, it can 
be saved on disk as *.EIP file. 
 
The EIP Manager  – How to… 
 
Create new EIP - From the EIP Manager, activate the selection tool , then click 
the target system component in the system view. 
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Figure 4.8. The Error Injection Points Manager dialog 
 
Save EIP – Select the EIP from EIPs list, then click Save button  and provide a 
name for the EIP file. The default folder where the EIP files are hold is 
<InSIEME>\Systems\EIPs\. 
 
Add an EIP from file – Click Open button  and select the file corresponding to the 
EIP. 
 
Delete an EIP from list – Select the target EIP in list, then click Delete EIP button . 
 
Select and Center – Select the target EIP in list, then click Select and Center button 
. 
 
Reset the EIP – The reset procedure ensures that the EIP characteristic values 
(Trend, Incapability Index) are set to zero. Select the target EIP in list, then click 
Reset EIP button . 
 
Get Route – Select the target EIP in list corresponding to the start point of the route, 
then click Select Destination button  and click the destination component in the 
system view. The GetRoute dialog will start in EIP from list mode (see Section X). 
 
  
Adjust Threshold Limits  
 
This pre-simulation phase is optional. As indicated, the severity of the impact caused 
by the incapability index of the system’s components is set by choosing the threshold 
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limits to define the operability states of a component (components level) and the 
threshold limits to characterize the system’s overall operability state (system level). 
 
The operability states for a component are set using the System Component 
Functionality Classification Levels feature, accessed from the System Analyst 
Gateway. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. The System Threshold Limits Manager dialogs 
 
When OK is selected, the user is prompted about reflecting the changes in the 
system view. If Yes, InSIEME automatically updates the legend of the themes in the 
system view to reflect the new settings for the threshold limits. 
 
To set the threshold limits for the Infrastructure Failure Index and Weighted 
Infrastructure Failure Index one should start the IFI Classification Levels module from 
the System Analyst Gateway. The importance weights can also be modified from the 
same dialog box. 
 
The Static Simulation – Error Dispersion Model 
 
When all the phases above are completed, the system is properly defined for the 
effective analysis. To start an analysis based on the Error Dispersion Model one 
should select Static Simulation in the System Analyst Gateway. 
 
The simulation is controlled through the Static Simulation window (Fig. 4.10). The 
Static Simulation control window is split into four areas, as follows: 
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• Error Injection Points Management (1) providing the same tools as the Error 
Injection Points Manager. 
• Results Visualization and Statistics (2) 
• EIPs Control (3). 
• Simulation Control (4). 
 
An analysis procedure implies (i) to set the Incapability Indexes for each of the 
system’s EIP; (ii) to run the simulation; and (iii) to analyze the results. 
 
 
Simulation Procedure – How to… 
 
Set the EIPs’ error level  
  
 1. Select the error injection point in EIP list. 
 2. Click Change button. 
3. Provide the incapability index in Trend textbox. 
 4. Press Enter. 
 
Notes:  
 
1. The current error injection point is not updated until Enter key is pressed after 
providing the trend.  
2. If only one EIP in EIP list, double-click in EIP list to refresh the information in 
Simulation Window. 
 
 
Run simulation – click Run button . When the computational phase is done, the 
results are reflected in the system view. 
 
To reset the system, one should use the Reset button . 
 
For details regarding the result analysis please refer to Section ‘The Analysis’, to 
follow. 
 
The Dynamic Simulation – Error Flow Model 
 
To start an analysis based on the Error Flow Model one should select Dynamic 
Simulation in System Analyst Gateway. 
 
The simulation is controlled through the Dynamic Simulation window (Fig. 4.11). The 
Dynamic Simulation control window is split into six areas, as follows: 
 
• Error Injection Points Management (1) providing the same tools as the Error 
Injection Points Manager. 
• Results Visualization and Statistics (2) 
• EIPs Control (3). 
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Figure 4.10. The Static Simulation run dialog 
 
 
Figure 4.11. The Dynamic Simulation run dialog 
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• Continuous Simulation Settings and Simulation Stop Conditions (4). 
• Simulation Window Behavior (5). 
• Simulation Control (6). 
 
The dynamic simulation module provides a variety of options that are useful in 
analyzing the system behavior to error-induced stress. 
 
Stop Conditions – The simulation stops when either of the stop conditions are 
reached. The conditions refer to components operability state, or the system failure 
state. A typical  example of using the stop conditions is to determine if a given 
dynamic of error leads to an incapability index higher than the Partially Disfunctional 
state of a target component, or to an Unacceptable state of the system failure.  
 
‘Healing process’ should be selected when the system is already in a dysfunctional 
state (e.g. WIFI is Unacceptable) and one wants to determine which is the system 
dynamic and how many simulation steps are required for placing the system in an 
Acceptable state. 
 
An analysis procedure implies:  
 
(i) Set the Incapability Index Trends for each of the system’s EIP. 
(ii) Set the number of continuous simulation steps. 
(iii) Set simulation stop conditions. 
(iv) Run simulation. 
(v) Analyze results. 
 
 
The analysis 
 
InSIEME provides a number of tools that are helpful in analyzing the system. This 
section covers several evaluation techniques and the tools to be used in the process. 
 
Visualize the error propagation from an EIP, on a simulation step-by-step basis 
 
This feature allows the visualization of the connections between system 
components that are traveled by the error in the specified simulation step. The 
current step also indicates the current influence level. 
 
This feature is useful, for instance, in determining the order in which the 
components are reached by the error, or the influence level corresponding to the 
highest number of components that are simultaneously affected by the error. 
 
The feature is available from any application module that handles the system’s 
EIPs. The user should select the target EIP in the EIP list, then navigate from one 
simulation step (influence level) to another using the arrow buttons next to the 
Simulation Step textbox. The result is the highlight of the current interconnections 
in the system view. 
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Extracting the error injection routes 
 
The error injection routes hold the sequence of components reached by the error 
on the way from an EIP to a target component. As indicated in Chapter 3, the 
origin of the route is an EIP. 
 
The starting point can be selected (i) as one of the system EIPs or (ii) as any of 
the system components. In the last case, a temporary EIP will be generated for 
the component selected as starting point. The temporary EIP will not be added in 
the system EIP list.  
 
To extract the error routes one should access the Get Paths feature, either (i) by 
selecting Get Error Paths button  from the System Analyst Gateway, or (ii) by 
selecting the destination component in the system view using the Get Error Paths 
selection tool  from any application that handles the system EIPs. 
 
Once the routes are extracted, the following features are available: 
 
• Show All – highlights the components from all the routes in the system 
view. 
• Show Selected – highlights only the components of the selected route in 
the system view. 
• Real Data  – provides a text report containing the selected route 
components. The components are listed using the real data (e.g. Name) 
extracted from the corresponding themes data sources. The real data are 
extracted from the label field of each of the themes. Each record is 
formatted as: { parent class, real data, incapability index }. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12. The get Paths dialog 
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• Details of the selected route  – provides a statistic along the route, 
given as a text report with the following structure: 
 
 
Route Statistics 
 
 
ERROR INJECTION PATH: name 
 
Number of influenced System Components 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: the parent class 
        - Encountered: number of components 
        - Percent of total encountered 
 
Route Length: 
 
Most affected component(s) along the route 
    Value of incapability Index of the most affected component 
    From parent class, system component real data 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): computed as the sum of the 
incapability indexes of the components along the route divided by their 
number. 
 
  
• Chart  the Incapability Index along the selected route. 
 
 
Note: If the starting point of the route is not a system EIP, any information regarding 
the error along the route is irrelevant, since the incapability indices of the 
components of the temporary EIP are set to 0. In other words, if the analysis is 
focused on the error values (e.g. evaluating the error on a route after a simulation 
procedure) the option of selecting the EIP from the system EIPs should be used.  
 
The System Components Chart 
 
The System Components Chart displays the incapability indices of all the system 
components. It reflects the impact of the initial failures on the system operability. 
 
The System Table 
 
The System Table holds the system state given by the component error level. 
The components are given by real data.  
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Figure 4.13. Example of System Components Chart 
 
Tracing System Behavior in Time 
 
This is only available in Dynamic Simulation. The system behavior is expressed 
by the variation of the Infrastructure Failure Index and Weighted Infrastructure 
Failure Index on each simulation step, and given as a chart. By analyzing the 
chart, one can obtain information regarding:  
 
• the most critical simulation steps - from the number of components 
simultaneously affected by the error viewpoint, given by the ramp of the IFI 
graph, or 
• the most critical simulation steps - from the severity of the impact the error 
has on the system, given by the ramp of the WIFI graph. 
 
 
Trace Components 
 
Only available in Dynamic Simulation mode. By using this feature, the analysis is 
driven towards the system components level. 
 
For each of the system components that are selected to be traced, InSIEME 
keeps the record of the incapability index at each simulation step. The result is 
the dynamic of error affecting the component. A chart, as well as a table in real 
data format with all the traced components is provided (Fig. 4.14b). 
 
The procedure of tracing components requires several steps: 
 
1) Build the traced components list. 
a. In Dynamic Simulation window, click Edit Traced System Components 
List button . The Trace System Components dialog will pop up. 
b. Using the selection tool from the Trace System Components add the 
target components by selecting them from the system view. 
2) Run simulation 
3) Visualize results…  
a. …as chart – in Dynamic Simulation window, click Display Traced 
Element Chart button . Select the elements you want to display 
from the list that will pop up, then click OK. 
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b. …as table – in Dynamic Simulation window, click Display Traced 
Element Table button . 
 
Simulation Results Statistics 
 
These are determined with regard to the current state of the system. The 
following information is available: 
 
• The Infrastructure Failure Level based on IFI and WIFI. 
• The number of reached system components. 
• The number and percent of total system components reached by error, 
BY TYPE (CLASS).  
• The number system components that are reached, BY OPERABILITY 
LEVEL. 
• The overall incapability index of the system. 
 
• The most affected system components, and 
• For each of the system EIPs, the number and the list of the affected 
components. 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Example of charts 
(a) IFI / WIFI Chart; (b) Traced components chart 
 
  
Chapter 4 – InSIEME. The Application 
Application Framework InSIEME  
 
 
 55 
 
Such features, together with the CRISA-specific and native ArcView analytical tools, 
would make InSIEME a potentially effective tool in assessing the vulnerability of the 
complex systems via error propagation mechanisms. 
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5 
 
 
InSIEME Showcase 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter gives two examples of effective use of InSIEME by providing two 
workflows, the first for the Static Simulation and the second for the Dynamic 
Simulation. The analysis does not cover all the possible methods of assessment; 
however, it is considered representative in giving an idea about the capability of 
InSIEME. 
 
 
5.1 Pre-Assessment Phase 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the first step in using InSIEME is to define the 
system. The InSIEME system is defined by the files crisa.sdf, crisa.iwf and crisa.sif. 
 
Once these files are selected as system definition files, the system is properly 
defined and one can proceed with the simulation and assessment phase. 
 
 
5.2 Static Simulation 
 
5.2.1 The Scenario 
 
We will consider the following scenario to be assessed:  
 
EVENT 1: due to unknown causes, a failure occurs in the power substation RAVENA 
CANALA, leading to a drop in its operability state (capability of service 
providing) by 50%. This is equivalent with an increase of the incapability 
index by 0.5. 
 
EVENT 2: following EVENT 1, a failure of the power plant BRINDISI SUD is also 
observed. The power plant operability drops by 75%, which is equivalent 
with a value of 0.75 of its incapability index. 
 
Queries 
 
1. How many influence steps are required for the error to reach all the system  
components starting from each of the error sources? 
 
2. What is the system operability state after each of the EVENTS? 
  
Chapter 5 – InSIEME Showcase 
Static Simulation The Workflow  InSIEME  
 
 
 57 
 
 
Which are the routes from each error source to power plant Torrevaldaliga? 
 
5.2.2 The Workflow 
 
For our example we will take the default values for the threshold limits and the 
influence weights matrix. The influence weights matrix is: 
 
 
  
     PL          PSS           PP 
 
Power Lines (PL) 
 
Power Substations (PS) 
 
Power Plants (PP) ⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
0.185.09.0
3.00.185.0
4.06.00.1
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 
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From the scenario it results that two system error injection points has to be defined, 
located at the power substation RAVENA CANALA and power station BRINDISI 
SUD, respectively (Fig. 5.1). In Fig. 5.1 the power plant Torrevaldaliga, which is 
subject to the analysis requested in Task 3, is also indicated. 
 
A workflow that would answer the given queries is proposed in the sequel. 
 
Solving Task 1 
 
One possible way to determine the number of influence levels that are required for 
the error to reach all the system components starting from each of the error sources 
is to use InSIEME’s Highlight Influence Level Components in System View. Highlight 
next level should be selected until the level counter stops incrementing.  
 
Solving Task 2 
 
A. Run Static Simulation with the following settings, to represent EVENT 1: 
 
 
 
Settings for Static Simulation run corresponding to 
EVENT 1 
EIP Incapability Index 
RAVENA CANALA 
BRINDISI SUD 
0.5 
0 
 
B. Get the results of the simulation from previous step: 
 
• Graphical Results 
o System Components Chart; 
o System State GIS Representation – from the system view. 
• Analytical and Statistical Results 
o System Chart 
o Simulation Report 
 
C. With the system in current state, run Static Simulation with the following settings: 
 
Settings for Static Simulation run corresponding to 
EVENT 2 
EIP Incapability Index 
RAVENA CANALA 
BRINDISI SUD 
0.5 
0.75 
 
D. Repeat Step C. 
 
Solving Task 3 
 
Task 3 is achieved using Get Routes feature provided by InSIEME. To get relevant 
information regarding the error dispersion along the determined routes, Get Routes 
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should be accessed from the Static Simulation Window, using the destination 
selection tool to select the power plant Torrevaldaliga from the system view. 
 
5.2.3 The Results 
 
Results for Task 1  
 
Results for Task 1 – which is the number of influence levels 
required by the error to reach all the 
system components. 
Starting from Influence levels 
RAVENA CANALA 
BRINDISI SUD 
37 
57 
 
 
 
Results for Task 2 
 
Results of the simulation of EVENT 1 
 
The GIS representation is the one from the system view. It is represented in Fig. 5.3.  
 
The incapability indexes of all the system components can be graphically visualized 
using the System Components Chart  feature (Fig. 5.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The components reached on the eight influence level by the error injected by RAVENA 
CANALA. 
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Fig. 5.3 The system state after the simulation corresponding to EVENT 1. Zoom to the area 
characterized by partially disabled system components.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 The system components chart after the simulation  
corresponding to EVENT 1.  
 
The system components table is given is the sequel. Note that the following is only 
an excerpt containing: 
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• the components that are reached by the error, and 
• only the Power Plants and Power Substations components. 
 
The extended version of this table is given in the Appendix. 
 
Table 5.1 System Components Table after EVENT 1 – Excerpt 
Key Name Incapability Index Classification 
Power Substations FORLI ORAZIANA 0.765 Out of Order 
Power Substations RAVENNA CANALA 0.500 Out of Order 
Power Substations COLUNGA 0.390 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations MARTIGNONE 0.390 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FANO E.T. 0.260 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations ADRIA SUD 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FERRARA FOCOMORTO 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations PORTO TOLLE 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations S. MARINO IN XX 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations BARGI STAZIONE 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DUGALE 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. DAMASO 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Enipower Ravenna 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Corsini 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CANDIA 0.133 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CALENZANO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAMIN 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAORSO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NOGAROLE ROCA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RUBIERA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SANDRIGO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Tolle 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Sermide 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Bargi Centrale 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSARA 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLANOVA 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#8 0.059 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CREMONA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIACENZA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CORDIGNANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LONATO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PARMA VIGHEFFIO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations POGGIO A CAIANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RFX CNR 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVARNUZZE 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SERMIDE 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LARINO 0.035 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLAVALLE 0.035 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Dolo 0.034 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GORLAGO 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NAVE 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#3 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA CASELLA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA SPEZIA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#10 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#9 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVAZZANO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MARGINONE 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN DELLA SPERANZA 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SUVERETO 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations UDINE OVEST 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations OSTIGLIA 0.024 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piacenza 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DOLO 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VENEZIA NORD 0.019 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations ANDRIA 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FOGGIA 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTALTO 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. FIORANO 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Montalto C.le 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BULCIAGO 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#2 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#4 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#5 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VIGNOLE B. 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA SUD 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ACCIAIOLO 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PLANAIS 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA NORD 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FLERO 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Substations REDIPUGLIA 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA EST 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Casella 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Spezia 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Tavazzano 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PRESENZANO 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA OVEST 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SALGAREDA 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piombino Termica 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations AURELIA 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BARI O. 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BENEVENTO 2 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BRINDISI 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VALMONTONE 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ostiglia 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#1 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN CAMUNO 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIEVE A 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SOAZZA 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VADO L. 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSEN 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Edolo 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants San Fiorano 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DIVACA 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#12 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LATINA NUCLEARE 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MATERA 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#7 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. SOFIA 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Monfalcone 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Presenzano 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GARIGLIANO S.NE 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MUSIGNANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ferrera E. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Roncovalgrande 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga Nord 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Vado L. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LAINO 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#11 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATRIA 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rosen 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BAGIO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CEPRANO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTECORVINO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. MARIA CAPUA V. 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TARANTO NORD 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rossano 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GALATINA 0.001 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations NA#6 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSSANO 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S.NE BRINDISI SUD 0.001 Fully Functional 
 
The Simulation Report after EVENT 1 reads: 
 
Box 1: System Report after EVENT 1  
 
THE SYSTEM 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Component Types: 3 
  > Power Lines 
  > Power Plants 
  > Power Substations 
 
Infrastructure Failure is considered: 
  > 'Acceptable', if 0 < (W)IFI < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Acceptable', if 0.2 <= (W)IFI < 0.5 
  > 'Unacceptable', if 0.5 <= (W)IFI <= 1 
where: 
  - (W)IFI - the (Weighted) Infrastructure Failure Index.  
 
The weights for computing WIFI: 
  > Fully Functional: 0.1 
  > Partially Disabled: 0.5 
  > Out of Order: 1 
 
A System Component (SC) is 
  > 'Fully Functional', if 0 < II < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Disabled', if 0.2 <= II < 0.5 
  > 'Out of Order', if 0.5 <= II <= 1 
where: 
  - II - the Incapability Index of the component.  
 
 
STATUS 
 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.121652 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "UNACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.803419 
 
THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
 
Number of System Components reached: 314 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 160, representing 46% 
  Power Plants - 24, representing 7% 
  Power Substations - 98, representing 28% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 3 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 18 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 139 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 24 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
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    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 7 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 89 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0569202 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 1, with the Incapability Index: 0.867 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
 
THE ERROR INJECTION POINTS 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 314 
   >> Power Substations #73 - "RAVENNA CANALA": 0.5 
   >> Power Lines #92 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #89 - "Double": 0.425 
 
  . 
  . 
  . 
 
   >> Power Lines #31 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #125 - "ROSSANO": 0.001 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #2: none 
 
 
Results of the simulation of EVENT 2 
 
The GIS representation is the one from the system view. It is rendered in Fig. 5.5.  
 
The incapability indexes of all the system components can be graphically visualized 
using System Components Chart  feature (Fig. 5.5). 
 
The system components table (in excerpt version) is given Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 System Components Table after EVENT 2 – Excerpt 
Key Name Incapability Index Classification 
Power Substations FORLI ORAZIANA 0.766 Out of Order 
Power Plants Brindisi Sud 0.750 Out of Order 
Power Substations RAVENNA CANALA 0.501 Out of Order 
Power Substations S.NE BRINDISI SUD 0.406 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations MARTIGNONE 0.391 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations COLUNGA 0.391 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FANO E.T. 0.262 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations S. MARINO IN XX 0.257 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations ADRIA SUD 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations PORTO TOLLE 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FERRARA FOCOMORTO 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations TARANTO NORD 0.208 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations GALATINA 0.207 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations S. DAMASO 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations BARGI STAZIONE 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations DUGALE 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Plants Enipower Ravenna 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Corsini 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CANDIA 0.137 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MATERA 0.110 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CALENZANO 0.102 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAORSO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RUBIERA 0.101 Fully Functional 
continue on page 62 
  
Chapter 5 – InSIEME Showcase 
Static Simulation The Results  InSIEME  
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 The system state after the simulation corresponding to EVENT 2. Zoom to the area 
characterized by partially disabled system components by BRINDISI SUD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The system components chart after the simulation  
corresponding to EVENT 2. 
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… continued from page60 
Power Substations NOGAROLE ROCA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SANDRIGO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAMIN 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Tolle 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Sermide 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLANOVA 0.075 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSARA 0.072 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Bargi Centrale 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BRINDISI 0.062 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#8 0.059 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIACENZA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CREMONA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LAINO 0.056 Fully Functional 
Power Substations POGGIO A CAIANO 0.054 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVARNUZZE 0.053 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LONATO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PARMA VIGHEFFIO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CORDIGNANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RFX CNR 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LARINO 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SERMIDE 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FOGGIA 0.046 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ANDRIA 0.045 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLAVALLE 0.039 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BARI O. 0.036 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Dolo 0.034 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GORLAGO 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NAVE 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#3 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BENEVENTO 2 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVAZZANO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA CASELLA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#9 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#10 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA SPEZIA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTECORVINO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MARGINONE 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN DELLA SPERANZA 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SUVERETO 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations UDINE OVEST 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations OSTIGLIA 0.024 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTALTO 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PRESENZANO 0.021 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piacenza 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rossano 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VENEZIA NORD 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DOLO 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. SOFIA 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA SUD 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Montalto C.le 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. FIORANO 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#2 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BULCIAGO 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#4 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#5 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VIGNOLE B. 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ACCIAIOLO 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA OVEST 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VALMONTONE 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA EST 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA NORD 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PLANAIS 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FLERO 0.012 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations REDIPUGLIA 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Substations AURELIA 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSSANO 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Tavazzano 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Spezia 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Casella 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SALGAREDA 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piombino Termica 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LATINA NUCLEARE 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. MARIA CAPUA V. 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ostiglia 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Presenzano 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VADO L. 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SOAZZA 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#1 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIEVE A 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN CAMUNO 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GARIGLIANO S.NE 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSEN 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATRIA 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Edolo 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants San Fiorano 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#12 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DIVACA 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#7 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SCANDALE 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Monfalcone 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga Nord 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CEPRANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MUSIGNANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Vado L. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ferrera E. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Roncovalgrande 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#11 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rosen 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BAGIO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RIZZICONI 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#6 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SORGENTE 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATERNO 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CHIARAMONTE GULFI 0.001 Fully Functional 
 
The Simulation Report after EVENT 2 is: 
 
Box 2: Simulation Report for EVENT 2  
 
THE SYSTEM 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Component Types: 3 
  > Power Lines 
  > Power Plants 
  > Power Substations 
 
Infrastructure Failure is considered: 
  > 'Acceptable', if 0 < (W)IFI < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Acceptable', if 0.2 <= (W)IFI < 0.5 
  > 'Unacceptable', if 0.5 <= (W)IFI <= 1 
where: 
  - (W)IFI - the (Weighted) Infrastructure Failure Index.  
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The weights for computing WIFI: 
  > Fully Functional: 0.1 
  > Partially Disabled: 0.5 
  > Out of Order: 1 
 
A System Component (SC) is 
  > 'Fully Functional', if 0 < II < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Disabled', if 0.2 <= II < 0.5 
  > 'Out of Order', if 0.5 <= II <= 1 
where: 
  - II - the Incapability Index of the component.  
 
 
STATUS 
 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.140456 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "UNACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.837607 
 
THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
 
Number of System Components reached: 326 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 166, representing 47% 
  Power Plants - 25, representing 7% 
  Power Substations - 103, representing 29% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 4 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 21 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 141 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 1 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 24 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 13 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 88 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0709373 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 1, with the Incapability Index: 0.869 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
 
THE ERROR INJECTION POINTS 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 314 
   >> Power Substations #73 - "RAVENNA CANALA": 0.5 
   >> Power Lines #92 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #89 - "Double": 0.425 
 
  … 
 
   >> Power Lines #31 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #125 - "ROSSANO": 0.001 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #2: 176 
   >> Power Plants #23 - "Brindisi Sud": 0.75 
   >> Power Lines #149 - "Single": 0.675 
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   >> Power Substations #107 - "S.NE BRINDISI SUD": 0.405 
  … 
 
   >> Power Lines #74 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #61 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #63 - "Single": 0.001 
 
Results for Task 3 
 
The error injection routes from power substation RAVENNA CANALA to power 
plant Torrevaldaliga. 
 
Total number of routes detected: 2. The routes are rendered in Figure 5.7. 
 
The following is a description of each determined route, compiled from the Real Data 
and Details features provided by InSIEME in Get Routes dialog. 
 
Route 1 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Substations", "RAVENNA CANALA", with II="0.425" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.255" 
 > "Power Substations", "S. MARINO IN XX", with II="0.217" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.13" 
 > "Power Substations", "FANO E.T.", with II="0.221" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.133" 
 > "Power Substations", "CANDIA", with II="0.113" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.068" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLANOVA", with II="0.058" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.035" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLAVALLE", with II="0.03" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.018" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.015" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.009" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.008" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.003" 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 17 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 8 
        - Percent of total encountered: 47 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 1 
        - Percent of total encountered: 6 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 8 
        - Percent of total encountered: 47 
 
Route Length:543.399 (UNITS_LINEAR_KILOMETERS) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.425 
    From "Power Substations", system component "RAVENNA CANALA" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.102412 
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Route 2 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Substations", "RAVENNA CANALA", with II="0.425" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.255" 
 > "Power Substations", "S. MARINO IN XX", with II="0.217" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.13" 
 > "Power Substations", "FANO E.T.", with II="0.221" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.133" 
 > "Power Substations", "CANDIA", with II="0.113" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.068" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLANOVA", with II="0.058" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.035" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLAVALLE", with II="0.03" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.018" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.015" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.009" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.008" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.003" 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 17 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 8 
        - Percent of total encountered: 47 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 1 
        - Percent of total encountered: 6 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 8 
        - Percent of total encountered: 47 
 
Route Length:536.819 (UNITS_LINEAR_KILOMETERS) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.425 
    From "Power Substations", system component "RAVENNA CANALA" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.102412 
 
 
The incapability index along the route charts of the determined routes are the same. 
The reason is that, for the InSIEME system and in the considered case, the 
sequence of components is the same for both routes. Differences between routes are 
represented here by different power lines that connect components from the same 
class. This implies the same computations sequence for the incapability indices. 
 
Figure 5.8 renders the incapability index along the route 2. Note the peak that 
indicates the convergence of two or more channels of error propagation at the power 
substation FOGGIA. 
 
  
Chapter 5 – InSIEME Showcase 
Static Simulation The Results  InSIEME  
 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 5
.7
 T
he
 e
rro
r i
nj
ec
tio
n 
ro
ut
es
 fr
om
 R
A
VE
N
N
A
 C
A
N
A
LA
 to
 T
or
re
va
ld
al
ig
a 
(a
) A
ll 
ro
ut
es
;  
(b
) R
ou
te
 1
; (
c)
 R
ou
te
 2
 
  
Chapter 5 – InSIEME Showcase 
Static Simulation The Results  InSIEME  
 
 
 72 
 
The error injection routes from power plant BRINDISI SUD to power plant 
Torrevaldaliga. 
 
Total number of routes detected: 5. Depending on the scale of the GIS 
representations, the differences between two routes are not always evident. This 
situation is encountered in our case for Route 4 and Route 5. Figure 5.9 shows the 
difference between the two routes by zooming-in to the respective area; note how the 
difference is indistinguishable in Figure 5.10 (e) ( f ).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Incapability index along Route 2 from RAVENNA CANALA to Torrevaldaliga 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Zoom-in to the difference area of Route 4 and Route 5 from BRINDISI SUD to Torrevaldaliga 
 
 
The following is a description of each determined route, compiled from the Real Data 
and Details features provided by InSIEME in Get Routes dialog. 
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Route 1 
 
Real Data 
 
> "Power Plants", "Brindisi Sud", with II="0.675" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.405" 
 > "Power Substations", "S.NE BRINDISI SUD", with II="0.344" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.206" 
 > "Power Substations", "TARANTO NORD", with II="0.175" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.105" 
 > "Power Substations", "MATERA", with II="0.089" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.053" 
 > "Power Substations", "LAINO", with II="0.045" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.027" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTECORVINO", with II="0.023" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "S. SOFIA", with II="0.012" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.007" 
 > "Power Substations", "BENEVENTO 2", with II="0.018" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.011" 
 > "Power Substations", "PRESENZANO", with II="0.009" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.005" 
 > "Power Substations", "VALMONTONE", with II="0.004" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.001" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.001" 
 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 25 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 12 
        - Percent of total encountered: 48 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 2 
        - Percent of total encountered: 8 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 11 
        - Percent of total encountered: 44 
 
Route Length:585.355 (UNITS_LINEAR_MILES) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.675 
    From "Power Plants", system component "Brindisi Sud" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.08952 
 
Route 2 
 
Real Data 
  
> "Power Plants", "Brindisi Sud", with II="0.675" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.405" 
 > "Power Substations", "S.NE BRINDISI SUD", with II="0.344" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.206" 
 > "Power Substations", "TARANTO NORD", with II="0.175" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.105" 
 > "Power Substations", "MATERA", with II="0.089" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.053" 
 > "Power Substations", "BRINDISI", with II="0.045" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.027 
 > "Power Substations", "ANDRIA", with II="0.023" 
 
… continues on page 71 
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… continued from page69 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "FOGGIA", with II="0.024" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "BENEVENTO 2", with II="0.018" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.011" 
 > "Power Substations", "PRESENZANO", with II="0.009" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.005" 
 > "Power Substations", "VALMONTONE", with II="0.004" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.001" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.001" 
 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 25 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 12 
        - Percent of total encountered: 48 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 2 
        - Percent of total encountered: 8 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 11 
        - Percent of total encountered: 44 
 
Route Length:521.752 (UNITS_LINEAR_MILES) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.675 
    From "Power Plants", system component "Brindisi Sud" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.09028 
 
Route 3 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Plants", "Brindisi Sud", with II="0.675" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.405" 
 > "Power Substations", "S.NE BRINDISI SUD", with II="0.344" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.206" 
 > "Power Substations", "TARANTO NORD", with II="0.175" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.105" 
 > "Power Substations", "MATERA", with II="0.089" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.053" 
 > "Power Substations", "BRINDISI", with II="0.045" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.027" 
 > "Power Substations", "ANDRIA", with II="0.023" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "FOGGIA", with II="0.024" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "BENEVENTO 2", with II="0.018" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.011" 
 > "Power Substations", "PRESENZANO", with II="0.009" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.005" 
 > "Power Substations", "VALMONTONE", with II="0.004" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.001" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.001" 
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Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 25 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 12 
        - Percent of total encountered: 48 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 2 
        - Percent of total encountered: 8 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 11 
        - Percent of total encountered: 44 
 
Route Length:527.083 (UNITS_LINEAR_MILES) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.675 
    From "Power Plants", system component "Brindisi Sud" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.09028 
 
Route 4 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Plants", "Brindisi Sud", with II="0.675" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.405" 
 > "Power Substations", "S.NE BRINDISI SUD", with II="0.344" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.206" 
 > "Power Substations", "TARANTO NORD", with II="0.175" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.105" 
 > "Power Substations", "MATERA", with II="0.089" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.053" 
 > "Power Substations", "BRINDISI", with II="0.045" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.027" 
 > "Power Substations", "ANDRIA", with II="0.023" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "FOGGIA", with II="0.024" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "LARINO", with II="0.012" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.007" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLANOVA", with II="0.006" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.004" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLAVALLE", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.001" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.001" 
 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 25 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 12 
        - Percent of total encountered: 48 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 2 
        - Percent of total encountered: 8 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 11 
        - Percent of total encountered: 44 
 
Route Length:689.587 (UNITS_LINEAR_MILES) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
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    Value of incapability Index: 0.675 
    From "Power Plants", system component "Brindisi Sud" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.08968 
 
Route 5 
 
Real Data 
 
 > "Power Plants", "Brindisi Sud", with II="0.675" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.405" 
 > "Power Substations", "S.NE BRINDISI SUD", with II="0.344" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.206" 
 > "Power Substations", "TARANTO NORD", with II="0.175" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.105" 
 > "Power Substations", "MATERA", with II="0.089" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.053" 
 > "Power Substations", "BRINDISI", with II="0.045" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.027" 
 > "Power Substations", "ANDRIA", with II="0.023" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "FOGGIA", with II="0.024" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.014" 
 > "Power Substations", "LARINO", with II="0.012" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.007" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLANOVA", with II="0.006" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.004" 
 > "Power Substations", "VILLAVALLE", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "MONTALTO", with II="0.003" 
 > "Power Lines", "Double", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Substations", "AURELIA", with II="0.002" 
 > "Power Lines", "Single", with II="0.001" 
 > "Power Plants", "Torrevaldaliga", with II="0.001" 
 
 
Details and 
Statistics 
 
Number of System Componenets influenced: 25 
 
Influenced System Components by type: 
    Component Type: Power Lines 
        - Encountered: 12 
        - Percent of total encountered: 48 
    Component Type: Power Plants 
        - Encountered: 2 
        - Percent of total encountered: 8 
    Component Type: Power Substations 
        - Encountered: 11 
        - Percent of total encountered: 44 
 
Route Length:694.918 (UNITS_LINEAR_MILES) 
 
Most affected components along the route: 1 
    Value of incapability Index: 0.675 
    From "Power Plants", system component "Brindisi Sud" 
 
Overall Incapability Index (averaged): 0.08968 
 
Figure 5.11 renders the incapability indexes graph along Route 1. 
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Fig. 5.11 Incapability index along Route 1 from BRINDISI SUD 
to Torrevaldaliga 
 
 
5.3 Dynamic Simulation 
 
In this section the results of a dynamic simulation procedure are reported. The 
presentation is focused on the system behavior to error injected from the same error 
injection point. Three error profile inputs are considered, namely a step function, a 
ramp function and an impulse function. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 System representation for the dynamic simulation examples 
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The simulation is performed under the following terms: 
 
• System definition files: crisa.sdf, crisa.iwf, crisa.sif; 
• System error injection points: Power Substation RAVENA CANNALA; 
• Stop Condition: the simulation runs until the Power Substation CANDIA goes 
into a  Partially Disabled state; if CANDIA never goes into partially disabled, 
the simulation is also stopped. 
 
The first section details the procedure of simulating and implementing the different 
shape error signals. The comparative results extracted from the InSIEME reports 
generated for each of the simulation sessions are presented in the second section, 
while the third contains several comparative results regarding the system state during 
different simulation steps. 
 
 
5.3.1. Modeling the Error Functions 
 
In the current version InSIEME does not provide a tool to define an error input profile 
prior to the simulation phase. This is the reason why special attention should be paid 
to the pre-assessment phase, in order to satisfactorily provide for a proper error 
variation to be interactively implemented during the simulation session. 
 
Figure 5.13 is a description of the error functions that are to be implemented, as well 
as the corresponding procedure. Details are given in the sequel. 
 
Step Function Case 
 
This case requires no intermediate trend input during simulation. The procedure is: 
 
• Set the error injection point Trend to 1; 
• Run simulation for any given number of countinuous simulation steps. 
 
Note that in the presented case the step function height is 1, which implies that the 
error injection point can be left at 1 during the simulation, since the value of the 
incapability index is limited to 1. If the step height is smaller than 1 the procedure 
becomes: 
 
• Set the error injection point Trend to the value corresponding to the height of 
the step function; 
• Run simulation for one simulation step. 
• Set the error injection point Trend to the 0; 
• Run simulation for any given number of continuous simulation steps. 
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Figure 5.13 Flow chart of the error profiles implementation 
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Ramp Function Case 
 
This case requires two or three continuous runs, as follows: 
 
Function ceiling case (three parts) 
 
• Set the error injection point Trend to the value corresponding to the growth 
rate of the error; 
• Run simulation for a number of continuous simulation steps equal with the 
integer part of the division between the target error value (maximum error 
value) and the current Trend; 
• Set the error injection point Trend to 0 if a ceiling is requested; 
• Run simulation for a number of continuous simulation steps corresponding to 
the desired width of the function ceiling; 
• Set the error injection point Trend to a negative value corresponding to the 
decay rate of the error; 
• Run simulation for any given number of continuous simulation steps. 
 
No function ceiling case (two parts) 
 
• Set the error injection point Trend to the value corresponding to the growth 
rate of the error; 
• Run simulation for a number of continuous simulation steps equal with the 
integer part of the division between the target error value (maximum error 
value) and the current Trend; 
• Set the error injection point Trend to a negative value corresponding to the 
decay rate of the error; 
• Run simulation for any given number of continuous simulation steps. 
 
Impulse Function Case 
 
This case requires three continuous runs. The procedure is: 
 
• Set the error injection point Trend to 1 (or the target value for the impulse 
height); 
• Run simulation for one simulation step; 
• Set the error injection point Trend to (-2); 
• Run simulation for one simulation step; 
• Set the error injection point Trend to 0; 
• Run simulation for any given number of continuous simulation steps. 
 
The problem of implementing the error functions complicates itself with the scenario’s 
complexity. For instance, the existence of several system error injection points, or 
different growth / decay rates of the error functions requires a higher attention in 
designing the error evolution-continuous run charts. 
 
However, a well designed pre-simulation phase allows the implementation of 
complex scenarios, and the comparative assessment of a large variety of cases. 
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5.3.2 Results of the Dynamic Simulation 
 
This section introduces several results of the simulations for the scenarios 
corresponding to the initial settings in Section 5.3 and the three error profiles 
considered in Section 5.3.1. The results are given in a comparative way, in order to 
emphasize the different reaction of the system in each of the considered cases. 
 
The error propagation is also assessed at the components’ level by tracing the 
system components reaction to the injected error. The system components that are 
considered are the power substations along the error injection route from RAVENA 
CANALA to CANDIA. The following correlation table should be used when reading 
the Traced Components Charts in this section. 
 
 
InSIEME Component 
 
Real Name 
Power Substation 73 RAVENNA CANALA 
Power Substation 72 FORLI ORAZIANA 
Power Substation 74 S. MARINO IN XX 
Power Substation 75 FANO E.T. 
Power Substation 76 CANDIA 
 
 
The STOP CONDITION (Power Substation CANDIA to be Partially Disabled) is 
reached in all the simulation cases, as follows: 
 
• Step Error Case – after six simulation steps; 
• Ramp Error Case – after ten simulation steps; 
• Impulse Error Case – after six simulation case. 
 
The system state representation is given in Figure 5.14. Notice the different error 
diffusion levels corresponding to the different error profiles. This also emerges from 
analyzing the data in Figure 5.15, which holds the system components charts.  
 
The comparative results for each of the simulation sessions are given in Box 3. 
The data is excerpted from the corresponding InSIEME simulation reports.  
 
 
Box 3: Results   
 
STEP error function 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.0823362 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.11396 
 
continues on page 81 
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…continued from page 78 
 
Number of System Components reached: 40 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 22, representing 6% 
  Power Plants - 4, representing 1% 
  Power Substations - 14, representing 4% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 12 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 9 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 1 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 2 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 2 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
    > 9 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 4 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 1 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0634217 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 3, with the Incapability Index: 1 
   > Power Substations #72: "FORLI ORAZIANA" 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
   > Power Substations #73: "RAVENNA CANALA" 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 44 
 
 
RAMP Error Function 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.0501425 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.182336 
 
Number of System Components reached: 64 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 37, representing 11% 
  Power Plants - 5, representing 1% 
  Power Substations - 22, representing 6% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 12 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 23 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 5 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
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    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 7 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 13 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0333846 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 1, with the Incapability Index: 0.651 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 68 
 
 
IMPULSE Error Function 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.00598291 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.014245 
 
Number of System Components reached: 5 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 0, representing 0% 
  Power Plants - 0, representing 0% 
  Power Substations - 5, representing 1% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 0 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 0 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 4 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 1 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.00328775 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 4, with the Incapability Index: 0.265 
   > Power Substations #45: "S. DAMASO" 
   > Power Substations #46: "BARGI STAZIONE" 
   > Power Substations #53: "DUGALE" 
   > Power Substations #76: "CANDIA" 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 5 
 
 
The system failure state during the simulations are given in Figure 5.16. This is 
an expression of the system reaction to the different error profiles. 
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The influence flow (error propagation) at the traced components level is given in 
Figure 5.17. Notice how the initial error profiles echo in the case of each of the 
components. 
 
Discussion 
 
This section covers some interesting aspects that emerge from the considered 
scenarios. First, one can see that the initial task, i.e. to determine if the power 
substation goes to a Partially Disabled state, is achieved for all scenarios. However, 
the number of simulation steps to get in this state is higher for the RAMP case that 
for the other two. The reason resides in the intensity level variation of the injected 
error: while for the STEP and IMPULSE cases the error ‘jumps’ from 0 to 1 in one 
simulation step, in the RAMP case it takes four simulation steps to reach the 
maximum value. Due to the fact that the error profile echoes in the subsequent, 
influenced system components (see Fig. 5.17), the incapability index of the target 
component (CANDIA) requires more ‘time’ to ascend to a level higher than the 
Partially Disabled threshold. 
 
On the other hand, the number of simulation steps in the STEP and IMPULSE cases 
is the same, since the EIP’s initial incapability index variation and the sequence of 
influenced components are the same. 
 
The situation when the error continues to spread within the system even though the 
error injection point is fully recovered, is encountered in RAMP and IMPULSE cases 
(see Fig. 5.14, 5.15, 5.17). One can see that at the time the target component goes 
into a Partially Disabled state the error is no longer injected in the system. This 
situation is the most evident in the IMPULSE case. 
 
Differences in the system behavior found under diverse error-induced stress 
situations are also evidenced in these examples. For instance, notice how the error 
dispersion level (the number of influenced components) is the highest for the RAMP 
case, followed by the ones in STEP and IMPULSE cases. The reason is again the 
error profile of the error injection point. The error dispersion is the highest in the 
RAMP case because the target component is reached before going to a Partially 
Disabled state. This means that the error cumulates itself at power substation’s 
CANDIA level during several simulation steps; however, after the step when the 
power plant is reached by the error (incapability index higher than zero), CANDIA 
behaves itself as an influencing component, which leads to a further propagation of 
error (see Fig. 5.14, 5.15). Remember that the error dispersion is reflected by the 
Infrastructure Failure Index value. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 5.16 System failure state during the simulation sessions. 
(a) STEP scenario, (b) RAMP scenario, (c) Impulse scenario 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 5.17 Influence flow at the traced components level. 
(a) STEP scenario, (b) RAMP scenario, (c) Impulse scenario 
 
 
 
Following this, different results can be obtained for the same scenarios, given the 
target of the assessment. For instance, if the goal of the assessment is to categorize 
the scenarios based on the number of affected components, the results would be 
RAMP scenario, followed by STEP and IMPULSE scenarios. On the other hand, if 
the scenarios are categorized based on their severity (given by the Weighted 
Infrastructure Failure Index), the results would be STEP, RAMP and IMPULSE. For 
details, check Figures 5.14 and 5.16 and the Infrastructure Failure Index and 
Weighted Infrastructure Failure Index for the scenarios in Box 3. 
 
To conclude a short series of interesting cases, worth noticing is the instance that 
emerges from Figure 5.16 (b) that renders the system’s IFI and WIFI values during 
the RAMP scenario. Notice how starting from simulation step 7 IFI continues to grow 
up while WIFI presents a going-down trend. The process that leads to this can be 
summarized as: (i) the error dispersion continues (the number of components that 
are influenced increases), (ii) the level of influence for the newly reached 
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components (the incapability indices) is lower and lower due to components-
interaction weights, and (iii) the incapability indices of the already influenced 
components go down after the error peak has passed. The situation as presented 
boils down to the following: from (i), the IFI value grows up; from (ii) and (iii) the 
number of components in a Partially Disabled state goes down while the one in Fully 
Functional goes up, which leads to a decrease of the WIFI value. In other words, the 
situation corresponds to an increasing number of affected components, and yet to a 
lesser harm induced into the system. 
 
Section 5.3.3 presents a series of system snapshots taken during the simulation 
sessions, in order to emphasize the differences that occur in each of the scenarios. 
 
 
5.3.3 System Snapshots During Dynamic Simulation 
 
The current section renders the state of the system in steps 2 and 5 during the 
simulation sessions considered in this chapter. Maps of the error dispersion, as well 
as the system components charts and data regarding the error impact on the system 
are given.  
 
Notice the differences in the error propagation shapes, and the relevant values 
provided. 
 
System State in Step 2 
 
Error injection point: RAVENNA CANALA 
 
 RAVENNA CANALA SYSTEM 
ERROR 
PROFILE 
Trend Value Reached 
Components 
IFI WIFI 
STEP 1 1 7 0.022792 0.019943 
RAMP 0.25 0.5 7 0.022792 0.0128205 
IMPULSE 0 0 6 0.017094 0.0105413 
 
Error injection point: RAVENNA CANALA 
 
 RAVENNA CANALA SYSTEM 
ERROR 
PROFILE 
Trend Value Reached 
Components 
IFI WIFI 
STEP 1 1 29 0.0826211 0.0675214 
RAMP 0 1 29 0.0826211 0.0527066 
IMPULSE 0 0 6 0.017094 0.0105413 
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Figure 5.19 System Components Charts in simulation step 2 for 
(a) STEP case; (a) RAMP case; (a) IMPULSE case 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 5.21 System Components Charts in simulation step 2 for 
(a) STEP case; (a) RAMP case; (a) IMPULSE case 
 
 
 
(a) 
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6 
 
Concluding Remarks and 
Contemplated Developments 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is a review of the InSIEME concept. The rationale is presented in Chapter 
2. The formalism and the analytical explanation of the error dispersion and influence 
flow algorithms are given in Chapter 3. The Application is presented in Chapter 4, 
together with the most common workflows for system vulnerability assessment 
procedures. Chapter 5 introduces two relevant examples of using InSIEME’s Static 
and Dynamic Simulation features and the system behavior assessment using these 
modules. 
 
The examples (scenarios and analysis) given throughout the paper are instrumental 
in emphasizing aspects related to various types of system behavior under different 
error injection point distribution and error profiles. 
 
The paper has aimed at highlighting the main features supportive to a meaningful 
system analysis provided by InSIEME as well as some basic assessment 
techniques. Combining these with the CRISA features relating to enhanced 
multimedia GIS engines, and the native ArcView tools for spatial analysis would 
make the application a potentially effective tool in assessing the vulnerability of the 
complex systems via error propagation mechanisms. 
 
InSIEME is a concept proof. All model components may, in principle, be improved. 
Some possible directions for future development are given in the sequel.   
 
Of first evidence would be to design and implement an algorithm, and the 
consequent interface allowing a full specification and pre-processing of the time-
profile of the injected error, meant to replace the current interactive – and admittedly 
cumbersome – procedure. 
 
On a different scale, a superior model would imply the possibility of defining the 
subsystems as collections of system components. In such an approach, a subsystem 
is a black-box. The subsystem output is connected to one or more subsystems input 
lines, or to other system components. This allows the definition of one-to-many 
interaction relationships as a one-to-one relationship. For instance, let us consider 
the OIL STOCK MARKET as a system component class containing one component 
namely SM, the incapability index of which is related to the price of the fuel. SM 
interacts with all the thermal-type components (power plants) of the electricity 
generating system. In the current model, one-to-one interaction relationships should 
be established for each of the pairs (SM, thermal power plant). In the enhanced 
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model, the Thermal Power Plants subsystem would be defined as including the 
thermal power plants of the electricity generating system, and then just a single 
interaction relationship would be established between SM and the defined sub-
system. The immediate advantage of such an approach would be an improvement as 
far as both the computational time and the time required for the system design 
phase, while not loosing any capability of differentiating between different component 
classes. 
 
The definition of the component Incapability Index as a function of component-type 
related characteristics would be another nice-to-have improvement of the model. The 
component characteristics are, essentially, structural, operational and functional. The 
new approach would provide for a better simulation of complex interaction 
mechanisms, based on a detailed relationship of mutual influence of the components. 
 
To meet one of the current trends in complex system architecture vulnerability 
assessment, namely the system of systems approach, may be another goal to 
pursue, starting from the InSIEME concept. However, this would entail significant 
changes that would affect most of the project, from design to software 
implementation. Re-engineering the project in a OOP (Object Oriented Programming) 
manner becomes, in this case, a must. The most natural approach is to adopt ESRI’s 
Map Objects for the GIS part. Let it be reminded that Map Objects is a collection of 
GIS representation and analysis tools built around Microsoft’s  ActiveX technology. 
The immediate advantage is that the models can be implemented in a high-level 
programming environment (e.g. Microsoft Visual C++ or Microsoft Visual Basic) with 
the GIS tools embedded in the project.  
 
Last but not least, a very desirable improvement with InSIEME - and maybe the most 
challenging one - would be the radical revamping of the project so as to provide for a 
full-fledged distributed team work approach. The idea is to simultaneously run the 
application from remote locations by different stakeholders interested in the 
assessment. Brainstorming sessions, decision making processes or system analysis 
would become a team work involving people that participates from virtually any 
location. From the implementation point of view, this entails, inter alia, a client-server 
architecture for the project. Placing InSIEME on INTERNET would also open an 
avenue towards accessing shared, large and comprehensive databases for data 
mining and assessment-related information. 
 
Such possibilities, as well as other that may be contemplated would add value to the 
current work, provided an adequate lead time and resources are secured. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Full Simulation Report for EVENT 1 
 
THE SYSTEM 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Component Types: 3 
  > Power Lines 
  > Power Plants 
  > Power Substations 
 
Infrastructure Failure is considered: 
  > 'Acceptable', if 0 < (W)IFI < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Acceptable', if 0.2 <= (W)IFI < 0.5 
  > 'Unacceptable', if 0.5 <= (W)IFI <= 1 
where: 
  - (W)IFI - the (Weighted) Infrastructure Failure Index.  
 
The weights for computing WIFI: 
  > Fully Functional: 0.1 
  > Partially Disabled: 0.5 
  > Out of Order: 1 
 
A System Component (SC) is 
  > 'Fully Functional', if 0 < II < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Disabled', if 0.2 <= II < 0.5 
  > 'Out of Order', if 0.5 <= II <= 1 
where: 
  - II - the Incapability Index of the component.  
 
 
STATUS 
 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.121652 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "UNACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.803419 
 
THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
 
Number of System Components reached: 314 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 160, representing 46% 
  Power Plants - 24, representing 7% 
  Power Substations - 98, representing 28% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 3 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 18 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 139 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 0 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 24 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
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    > 7 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 89 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0569202 
 
Most Affected System Component(s): 1, with the Incapability Index: 0.867 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
 
THE ERROR INJECTION POINTS 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 314 
   >> Power Substations #73 - "RAVENNA CANALA": 0.5 
   >> Power Lines #92 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #89 - "Double": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #90 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #91 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #99 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #97 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #96 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #67 - "FERRARA FOCOMORTO": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #88 - "Double": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #66 - "PORTO TOLLE": 0.255 
   >> Power Plants #18 - "Porto Corsini": 0.17 
   >> Power Plants #17 - "Enipower Ravenna": 0.17 
   >> Power Substations #74 - "S. MARINO IN XX": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #100 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #93 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Substations #65 - "ADRIA SUD": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #181 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #98 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #101 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #102 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #95 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Lines #98 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Plants #33 - "Sermide": 0.087 
   >> Power Lines #87 - "Double": 0.217 
   >> Power Plants #16 - "Porto Tolle": 0.087 
   >> Power Substations #75 - "FANO E.T.": 0.13 
   >> Power Substations #75 - "FANO E.T.": 0.13 
   >> Power Substations #68 - "MARTIGNONE": 0.39 
   >> Power Lines #191 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Lines #189 - "Single": 0.078 
   >> Power Lines #103 - "Single": 0.221 
   >> Power Lines #86 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Lines #190 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Lines #62 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Substations #69 - "COLUNGA": 0.39 
   >> Power Substations #123 - "SERMIDE": 0.047 
   >> Power Substations #76 - "CANDIA": 0.133 
   >> Power Substations #53 - "DUGALE": 0.199 
   >> Power Substations #46 - "BARGI STAZIONE": 0.199 
   >> Power Substations #45 - "S. DAMASO": 0.199 
   >> Power Lines #94 - "Single": 0.04 
   >> Power Lines #114 - "Single": 0.113 
   >> Power Lines #67 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #76 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #80 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #75 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #74 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #61 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #63 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Substations #52 - "OSTIGLIA": 0.024 
   >> Power Substations #98 - "VILLANOVA": 0.068 
   >> Power Lines #182 - "Single": 0.113 
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   >> Power Substations #51 - "NOGAROLE ROCA": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #54 - "SANDRIGO": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #63 - "CAMIN": 0.101 
   >> Power Plants #13 - "Bargi Centrale": 0.068 
   >> Power Substations #70 - "CALENZANO": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #44 - "RUBIERA": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #32 - "CAORSO": 0.101 
   >> Power Lines #65 - "Single": 0.02 
   >> Power Lines #64 - "Single": 0.02 
   >> Power Lines #113 - "Single": 0.058 
   >> Power Lines #139 - "Single": 0.058 
   >> Power Substations #92 - "ROSARA": 0.068 
   >> Power Lines #66 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #77 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #81 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #82 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #73 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #105 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #60 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #55 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Plants #10 - "Ostiglia": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #40 - "FLERO": 0.012 
   >> Power Substations #90 - "VILLAVALLE": 0.035 
   >> Power Substations #99 - "LARINO": 0.035 
   >> Power Substations #42 - "LONATO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #55 - "CORDIGNANO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #64 - "RFX CNR": 0.052 
   >> Power Plants #34 - "Dolo": 0.034 
   >> Power Substations #71 - "TAVARNUZZE": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #47 - "POGGIO A CAIANO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #43 - "PARMA VIGHEFFIO": 0.052 
   >> Power Lines #54 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #173 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #48 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #54 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #112 - "Single": 0.03 
   >> Power Lines #140 - "Single": 0.03 
   >> Power Lines #49 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #78 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #177 - "Double": 0.031 
   >> Power Lines #194 - "Double": 0.031 
   >> Power Lines #104 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #104 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #109 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #107 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #72 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #59 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #57 - "Single": 0.096 
   >> Power Substations #31 - "PIACENZA": 0.058 
   >> Power Substations #39 - "NA#12": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #41 - "NAVE": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #80 - "MONTALTO": 0.018 
   >> Power Substations #100 - "FOGGIA": 0.018 
   >> Power Substations #41 - "NAVE": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #56 - "UDINE OVEST": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #61 - "VENEZIA NORD": 0.019 
   >> Power Substations #62 - "DOLO": 0.019 
   >> Power Substations #77 - "PIAN DELLA SPERANZA": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #78 - "SUVERETO": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #48 - "MARGINONE": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #33 - "CREMONA": 0.058 
   >> Power Lines #53 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #40 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #58 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #174 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #47 - "Single": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #45 - "Single": 0.027 
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   >> Power Lines #175 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #118 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #115 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #141 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #142 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #135 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #79 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #179 - "Single": 0.016 
   >> Power Lines #110 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #106 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #111 - "Double": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #108 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #106 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #70 - "Double": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #71 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #56 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #28 - "LA CASELLA": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #39 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #38 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #37 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #49 - "LA SPEZIA": 0.029 
   >> Power Plants #8 - "Piacenza": 0.02 
   >> Power Substations #35 - "NA#11": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #38 - "S. FIORANO": 0.016 
   >> Power Plants #20 - "Montalto C.le": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #85 - "VALMONTONE": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #81 - "AURELIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #102 - "ANDRIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #102 - "ANDRIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #97 - "BENEVENTO 2": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #59 - "PLANAIS": 0.013 
   >> Power Substations #60 - "SALGAREDA": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #87 - "ROMA NORD": 0.013 
   >> Power Plants #20 - "Montalto C.le": 0.009 
   >> Power Plants #19 - "Piombino Termica": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #50 - "ACCIAIOLO": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Substations #34 - "NA#10": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #50 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Substations #30 - "NA#9": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #38 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #29 - "NA#8": 0.059 
   >> Power Substations #27 - "TAVAZZANO": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #192 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #68 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #46 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #44 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #172 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #43 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #128 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #127 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #120 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #121 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #116 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #122 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #176 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #143 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #144 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #134 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #137 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #180 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #83 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #119 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #153 - "Single": 0.011 
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   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Plants #32 - "La Casella": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #34 - "Single": 0.05 
   >> Power Lines #41 - "Single": 0.05 
   >> Power Lines #193 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #36 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Plants #9 - "La Spezia": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #25 - "VIGNOLE B.": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #36 - "GORLAGO": 0.002 
   >> Power Plants #11 - "Edolo": 0.006 
   >> Power Plants #12 - "San Fiorano": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #37 - "PIAN CAMUNO": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #96 - "PRESENZANO": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #84 - "LATINA NUCLEARE": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #86 - "ROMA EST": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.005 
   >> Power Plants #21 - "Torrevaldaliga Nord": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.005 
   >> Power Plants #22 - "Torrevaldaliga": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #103 - "BARI O.": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #106 - "BRINDISI": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #96 - "PRESENZANO": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #95 - "S. SOFIA": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #83 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Substations #57 - "REDIPUGLIA": 0.012 
   >> Power Substations #86 - "ROMA EST": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #79 - "ROSEN": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #52 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #17 - "NA#3": 0.03 
   >> Power Substations #36 - "GORLAGO": 0.03 
   >> Power Plants #7 - "Tavazzano": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #19 - "NA#4": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #22 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #20 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #42 - "Double": 0.027 
   >> Power Lines #42 - "Double": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #184 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #125 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #126 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #130 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #129 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #124 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #123 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #145 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #145 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #147 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #136 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #138 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #85 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #84 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #195 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #26 - "NA#7": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #27 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #33 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #35 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #26 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #35 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Substations #23 - "PIEVE A": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #11 - "VADO L.": 0.008 
   >> Power Plants #25 - "Presenzano": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #89 - "GARIGLIANO S.NE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #89 - "GARIGLIANO S.NE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #104 - "MATERA": 0.005 
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   >> Power Substations #94 - "S. MARIA CAPUA V.": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #101 - "MONTECORVINO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #58 - "DIVACA": 0.006 
   >> Power Plants #15 - "Monfalcone": 0.004 
   >> Power Plants #14 - "Rosen": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #51 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #16 - "NA#2": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #18 - "BULCIAGO": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #20 - "NA#5": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #23 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #24 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #11 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #12 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #183 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #131 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #133 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #146 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #155 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #132 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #131 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #154 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #21 - "BAGIO": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #28 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #32 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #25 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Plants #4 - "Ferrera E.": 0.003 
   >> Power Plants #3 - "Vado L.": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #88 - "CEPRANO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #93 - "PATRIA": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #105 - "TARANTO NORD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #111 - "LAINO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #93 - "PATRIA": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #111 - "LAINO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #25 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #16 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #15 - "NA#1": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #13 - "SOAZZA": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #148 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #150 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #156 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #22 - "NA#6": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #29 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #107 - "S.NE BRINDISI SUD": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #108 - "GALATINA": 0.001 
   >> Power Plants #26 - "Rossano": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #171 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #109 - "MUSIGNANO": 0.004 
   >> Power Plants #27 - "Roncovalgrande": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #149 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #151 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #151 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #152 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #186 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #31 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #125 - "ROSSANO": 0.001 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #2: none 
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System Table after Event 1 
Key Name Value Class 
Power Substations VADO L. 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SOAZZA 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#1 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#2 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#3 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.050 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.038 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BULCIAGO 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#4 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#5 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BAGIO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#6 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIEVE A 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VIGNOLE B. 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#7 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVAZZANO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA CASELLA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#8 0.059 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.050 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.098 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#9 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIACENZA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.096 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAORSO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CREMONA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.096 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#10 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#11 0.003 Fully Functional 
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Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GORLAGO 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.034 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN CAMUNO 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. FIORANO 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#12 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FLERO 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NAVE 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LONATO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PARMA VIGHEFFIO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RUBIERA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. DAMASO 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.332 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations BARGI STAZIONE 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.332 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Substations POGGIO A CAIANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.088 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MARGINONE 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA SPEZIA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ACCIAIOLO 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NOGAROLE ROCA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Substations OSTIGLIA 0.024 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.040 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DUGALE 0.199 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.169 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.332 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations SANDRIGO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CORDIGNANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Substations UDINE OVEST 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations REDIPUGLIA 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations DIVACA 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PLANAIS 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SALGAREDA 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VENEZIA NORD 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.031 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DOLO 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.031 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAMIN 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RFX CNR 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ADRIA SUD 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.217 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations PORTO TOLLE 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.217 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FERRARA FOCOMORTO 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.217 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations MARTIGNONE 0.390 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.650 Out of Order 
Power Substations COLUNGA 0.390 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.650 Out of Order 
Power Substations CALENZANO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVARNUZZE 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FORLI ORAZIANA 0.765 Out of Order 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.867 Out of Order 
Power Substations RAVENNA CANALA 0.500 Out of Order 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.425 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations S. MARINO IN XX 0.255 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.217 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.217 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FANO E.T. 0.260 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.221 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations CANDIA 0.133 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.113 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN DELLA SPERANZA 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SUVERETO 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSEN 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTALTO 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations AURELIA 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA OVEST 0.010 Fully Functional 
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Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA SUD 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LATINA NUCLEARE 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VALMONTONE 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA EST 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA NORD 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CEPRANO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GARIGLIANO S.NE 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLAVALLE 0.035 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSARA 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.113 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATRIA 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. MARIA CAPUA V. 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. SOFIA 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PRESENZANO 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BENEVENTO 2 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLANOVA 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LARINO 0.035 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FOGGIA 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTECORVINO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ANDRIA 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BARI O. 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MATERA 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TARANTO NORD 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BRINDISI 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S.NE BRINDISI SUD 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GALATINA 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MUSIGNANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations LAINO 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SERMIDE 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.078 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSSANO 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Vado L. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ferrera E. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Tavazzano 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piacenza 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Spezia 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ostiglia 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Edolo 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants San Fiorano 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Bargi Centrale 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rosen 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Monfalcone 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Tolle 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Enipower Ravenna 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Corsini 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piombino Termica 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Montalto C.le 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga Nord 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Presenzano 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rossano 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Roncovalgrande 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Casella 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Sermide 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Dolo 0.034 Fully Functional 
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Full Simulation Report for EVENT 2 
 
THE SYSTEM 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Component Types: 3 
  > Power Lines 
  > Power Plants 
  > Power Substations 
 
Infrastructure Failure is considered: 
  > 'Acceptable', if 0 < (W)IFI < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Acceptable', if 0.2 <= (W)IFI < 0.5 
  > 'Unacceptable', if 0.5 <= (W)IFI <= 1 
where: 
  - (W)IFI - the (Weighted) Infrastructure Failure Index.  
 
The weights for computing WIFI: 
  > Fully Functional: 0.1 
  > Partially Disabled: 0.5 
  > Out of Order: 1 
 
A System Component (SC) is 
  > 'Fully Functional', if 0 < II < 0.2 
  > 'Partially Disabled', if 0.2 <= II < 0.5 
  > 'Out of Order', if 0.5 <= II <= 1 
where: 
  - II - the Incapability Index of the component.  
 
 
STATUS 
 
THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "ACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index (weighted)=0.140456 
 
Infrastructure Failure LEVEL: "UNACCEPTABLE", based on 
  Infrastructure Failure Index=0.837607 
 
THE SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
 
Number of System Components reached: 326 
 
Reached Components by Type: 
  Power Lines - 166, representing 47% 
  Power Plants - 25, representing 7% 
  Power Substations - 103, representing 29% 
 
Reached Components by Functionality Level: 
  From "Power Lines" 
    > 4 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 21 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 141 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Plants" 
    > 1 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 0 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 24 components 'Fully Functional' 
  From "Power Substations" 
    > 2 components 'Out of Order' 
    > 13 components 'Partially Disabled' 
    > 88 components 'Fully Functional' 
 
Overall Incapability Index of the system: 0.0709373 
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Most Affected System Component(s): 1, with the Incapability Index: 0.869 
   > Power Lines #98: "Single" 
 
THE ERROR INJECTION POINTS 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #1: 314 
   >> Power Substations #73 - "RAVENNA CANALA": 0.5 
   >> Power Lines #92 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #89 - "Double": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #90 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #91 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #99 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #97 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Lines #96 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #67 - "FERRARA FOCOMORTO": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #88 - "Double": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #66 - "PORTO TOLLE": 0.255 
   >> Power Plants #18 - "Porto Corsini": 0.17 
   >> Power Plants #17 - "Enipower Ravenna": 0.17 
   >> Power Substations #74 - "S. MARINO IN XX": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #100 - "Single": 0.425 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #93 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Substations #65 - "ADRIA SUD": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #181 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #98 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #101 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Lines #102 - "Single": 0.217 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.255 
   >> Power Lines #95 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Lines #98 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Plants #33 - "Sermide": 0.087 
   >> Power Lines #87 - "Double": 0.217 
   >> Power Plants #16 - "Porto Tolle": 0.087 
   >> Power Substations #75 - "FANO E.T.": 0.13 
   >> Power Substations #75 - "FANO E.T.": 0.13 
   >> Power Substations #68 - "MARTIGNONE": 0.39 
   >> Power Lines #191 - "Single": 0.65 
   >> Power Lines #189 - "Single": 0.078 
   >> Power Lines #103 - "Single": 0.221 
   >> Power Lines #86 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Lines #190 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Lines #62 - "Single": 0.332 
   >> Power Substations #69 - "COLUNGA": 0.39 
   >> Power Substations #123 - "SERMIDE": 0.047 
   >> Power Substations #76 - "CANDIA": 0.133 
   >> Power Substations #53 - "DUGALE": 0.199 
   >> Power Substations #46 - "BARGI STAZIONE": 0.199 
   >> Power Substations #45 - "S. DAMASO": 0.199 
   >> Power Lines #94 - "Single": 0.04 
   >> Power Lines #114 - "Single": 0.113 
   >> Power Lines #67 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #76 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #80 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #75 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #74 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #61 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Lines #63 - "Single": 0.169 
   >> Power Substations #52 - "OSTIGLIA": 0.024 
   >> Power Substations #98 - "VILLANOVA": 0.068 
   >> Power Lines #182 - "Single": 0.113 
   >> Power Substations #51 - "NOGAROLE ROCA": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #54 - "SANDRIGO": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #63 - "CAMIN": 0.101 
   >> Power Plants #13 - "Bargi Centrale": 0.068 
   >> Power Substations #70 - "CALENZANO": 0.101 
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   >> Power Substations #44 - "RUBIERA": 0.101 
   >> Power Substations #32 - "CAORSO": 0.101 
   >> Power Lines #65 - "Single": 0.02 
   >> Power Lines #64 - "Single": 0.02 
   >> Power Lines #113 - "Single": 0.058 
   >> Power Lines #139 - "Single": 0.058 
   >> Power Substations #92 - "ROSARA": 0.068 
   >> Power Lines #66 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #77 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #81 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #82 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #73 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #105 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #60 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #55 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Plants #10 - "Ostiglia": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #40 - "FLERO": 0.012 
   >> Power Substations #90 - "VILLAVALLE": 0.035 
   >> Power Substations #99 - "LARINO": 0.035 
   >> Power Substations #42 - "LONATO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #55 - "CORDIGNANO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #64 - "RFX CNR": 0.052 
   >> Power Plants #34 - "Dolo": 0.034 
   >> Power Substations #71 - "TAVARNUZZE": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #47 - "POGGIO A CAIANO": 0.052 
   >> Power Substations #43 - "PARMA VIGHEFFIO": 0.052 
   >> Power Lines #54 - "Single": 0.086 
   >> Power Lines #173 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #48 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #54 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #112 - "Single": 0.03 
   >> Power Lines #140 - "Single": 0.03 
   >> Power Lines #49 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #78 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #177 - "Double": 0.031 
   >> Power Lines #194 - "Double": 0.031 
   >> Power Lines #104 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #104 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #109 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #107 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #72 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #59 - "Single": 0.044 
   >> Power Lines #57 - "Single": 0.096 
   >> Power Substations #31 - "PIACENZA": 0.058 
   >> Power Substations #39 - "NA#12": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #41 - "NAVE": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #80 - "MONTALTO": 0.018 
   >> Power Substations #100 - "FOGGIA": 0.018 
   >> Power Substations #41 - "NAVE": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #56 - "UDINE OVEST": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #61 - "VENEZIA NORD": 0.019 
   >> Power Substations #62 - "DOLO": 0.019 
   >> Power Substations #77 - "PIAN DELLA SPERANZA": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #78 - "SUVERETO": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #48 - "MARGINONE": 0.026 
   >> Power Substations #33 - "CREMONA": 0.058 
   >> Power Lines #53 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #40 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #58 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #174 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #47 - "Single": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #45 - "Single": 0.027 
   >> Power Lines #175 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #118 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #115 - "Double": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #141 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #142 - "Single": 0.015 
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   >> Power Lines #135 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #79 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #179 - "Single": 0.016 
   >> Power Lines #110 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #106 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #111 - "Double": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #108 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #106 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #70 - "Double": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #71 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Lines #56 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #28 - "LA CASELLA": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #39 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #38 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Lines #37 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #49 - "LA SPEZIA": 0.029 
   >> Power Plants #8 - "Piacenza": 0.02 
   >> Power Substations #35 - "NA#11": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #38 - "S. FIORANO": 0.016 
   >> Power Plants #20 - "Montalto C.le": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #85 - "VALMONTONE": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #81 - "AURELIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #102 - "ANDRIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #102 - "ANDRIA": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #97 - "BENEVENTO 2": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #59 - "PLANAIS": 0.013 
   >> Power Substations #60 - "SALGAREDA": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #87 - "ROMA NORD": 0.013 
   >> Power Plants #20 - "Montalto C.le": 0.009 
   >> Power Plants #19 - "Piombino Termica": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #50 - "ACCIAIOLO": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.022 
   >> Power Substations #34 - "NA#10": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #50 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Substations #30 - "NA#9": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #38 - "Single": 0.049 
   >> Power Substations #29 - "NA#8": 0.059 
   >> Power Substations #27 - "TAVAZZANO": 0.029 
   >> Power Lines #192 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #68 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #46 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #44 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #172 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #43 - "Double": 0.014 
   >> Power Lines #128 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #127 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #120 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #121 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #116 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #122 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #176 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #143 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #144 - "Single": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #134 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #137 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #180 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #83 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #119 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #153 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Plants #32 - "La Casella": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #34 - "Single": 0.05 
   >> Power Lines #41 - "Single": 0.05 
   >> Power Lines #193 - "Single": 0.025 
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   >> Power Lines #36 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Plants #9 - "La Spezia": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #25 - "VIGNOLE B.": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #36 - "GORLAGO": 0.002 
   >> Power Plants #11 - "Edolo": 0.006 
   >> Power Plants #12 - "San Fiorano": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #37 - "PIAN CAMUNO": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #96 - "PRESENZANO": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #84 - "LATINA NUCLEARE": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #86 - "ROMA EST": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.005 
   >> Power Plants #21 - "Torrevaldaliga Nord": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.005 
   >> Power Plants #22 - "Torrevaldaliga": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #103 - "BARI O.": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #106 - "BRINDISI": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #96 - "PRESENZANO": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #95 - "S. SOFIA": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #83 - "Single": 0.011 
   >> Power Substations #57 - "REDIPUGLIA": 0.012 
   >> Power Substations #86 - "ROMA EST": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #79 - "ROSEN": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #52 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #17 - "NA#3": 0.03 
   >> Power Substations #36 - "GORLAGO": 0.03 
   >> Power Plants #7 - "Tavazzano": 0.01 
   >> Power Substations #19 - "NA#4": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #22 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #20 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #42 - "Double": 0.027 
   >> Power Lines #42 - "Double": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #184 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #125 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #126 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #130 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #129 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #124 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #123 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #145 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #145 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #147 - "Single": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #136 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #138 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #85 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #84 - "Single": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #195 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #26 - "NA#7": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #27 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #33 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #35 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #26 - "Single": 0.025 
   >> Power Lines #35 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Substations #23 - "PIEVE A": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #11 - "VADO L.": 0.008 
   >> Power Plants #25 - "Presenzano": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #89 - "GARIGLIANO S.NE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #89 - "GARIGLIANO S.NE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #104 - "MATERA": 0.005 
   >> Power Substations #94 - "S. MARIA CAPUA V.": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #101 - "MONTECORVINO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #58 - "DIVACA": 0.006 
   >> Power Plants #15 - "Monfalcone": 0.004 
   >> Power Plants #14 - "Rosen": 0.002 
  
Appendix – Full result tables for the examples in Chapter 5.2. 
Simulation Report for EVENT 2 InSIEME  
 
 
 113 
 
   >> Power Lines #51 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #16 - "NA#2": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #18 - "BULCIAGO": 0.015 
   >> Power Substations #20 - "NA#5": 0.015 
   >> Power Lines #23 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #24 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #11 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #12 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Lines #183 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #131 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #133 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #146 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #155 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #132 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #131 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #154 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #21 - "BAGIO": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #28 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #32 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Lines #25 - "Single": 0.013 
   >> Power Plants #4 - "Ferrera E.": 0.003 
   >> Power Plants #3 - "Vado L.": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #88 - "CEPRANO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #93 - "PATRIA": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #105 - "TARANTO NORD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #111 - "LAINO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #93 - "PATRIA": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #111 - "LAINO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #25 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #16 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #15 - "NA#1": 0.008 
   >> Power Substations #13 - "SOAZZA": 0.008 
   >> Power Lines #148 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #150 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #156 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #22 - "NA#6": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #29 - "Single": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #107 - "S.NE BRINDISI SUD": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #108 - "GALATINA": 0.001 
   >> Power Plants #26 - "Rossano": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #171 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #109 - "MUSIGNANO": 0.004 
   >> Power Plants #27 - "Roncovalgrande": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #149 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #151 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #151 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #152 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #186 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #31 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #30 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #125 - "ROSSANO": 0.001 
 
Number of System Components affected by EIP #2: 176 
   >> Power Plants #23 - "Brindisi Sud": 0.75 
   >> Power Lines #149 - "Single": 0.675 
   >> Power Substations #107 - "S.NE BRINDISI SUD": 0.405 
   >> Power Lines #148 - "Single": 0.344 
   >> Power Lines #151 - "Single": 0.344 
   >> Power Substations #105 - "TARANTO NORD": 0.206 
   >> Power Substations #108 - "GALATINA": 0.206 
   >> Power Lines #146 - "Single": 0.175 
   >> Power Lines #150 - "Single": 0.175 
   >> Power Lines #150 - "Single": 0.175 
   >> Power Lines #152 - "Single": 0.175 
   >> Power Substations #104 - "MATERA": 0.105 
   >> Power Lines #147 - "Single": 0.089 
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   >> Power Lines #155 - "Single": 0.089 
   >> Power Substations #106 - "BRINDISI": 0.053 
   >> Power Substations #111 - "LAINO": 0.053 
   >> Power Lines #145 - "Single": 0.045 
   >> Power Lines #144 - "Single": 0.045 
   >> Power Lines #154 - "Single": 0.045 
   >> Power Lines #156 - "Single": 0.045 
   >> Power Substations #103 - "BARI O.": 0.027 
   >> Power Substations #102 - "ANDRIA": 0.027 
   >> Power Substations #101 - "MONTECORVINO": 0.027 
   >> Power Plants #26 - "Rossano": 0.018 
   >> Power Lines #143 - "Single": 0.023 
   >> Power Lines #141 - "Single": 0.023 
   >> Power Lines #143 - "Single": 0.023 
   >> Power Lines #142 - "Single": 0.023 
   >> Power Lines #138 - "Single": 0.023 
   >> Power Lines #186 - "Single": 0.016 
   >> Power Substations #100 - "FOGGIA": 0.014 
   >> Power Substations #100 - "FOGGIA": 0.014 
   >> Power Substations #95 - "S. SOFIA": 0.014 
   >> Power Substations #125 - "ROSSANO": 0.01 
   >> Power Lines #140 - "Single": 0.024 
   >> Power Lines #135 - "Single": 0.024 
   >> Power Lines #136 - "Single": 0.012 
   >> Power Lines #137 - "Single": 0.012 
   >> Power Lines #157 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Substations #99 - "LARINO": 0.014 
   >> Power Substations #97 - "BENEVENTO 2": 0.014 
   >> Power Substations #94 - "S. MARIA CAPUA V.": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #97 - "BENEVENTO 2": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #113 - "SCANDALE": 0.005 
   >> Power Lines #139 - "Single": 0.012 
   >> Power Lines #134 - "Single": 0.018 
   >> Power Lines #132 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Lines #131 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Lines #158 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #98 - "VILLANOVA": 0.007 
   >> Power Substations #96 - "PRESENZANO": 0.011 
   >> Power Substations #93 - "PATRIA": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #89 - "GARIGLIANO S.NE": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #114 - "RIZZICONI": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #114 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Lines #113 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Lines #128 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #184 - "Single": 0.009 
   >> Power Lines #133 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #183 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #133 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #129 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #130 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #159 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #76 - "CANDIA": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #182 - "Single": 0.006 
   >> Power Substations #90 - "VILLAVALLE": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #85 - "VALMONTONE": 0.005 
   >> Power Plants #25 - "Presenzano": 0.004 
   >> Power Substations #88 - "CEPRANO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #84 - "LATINA NUCLEARE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #84 - "LATINA NUCLEARE": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #115 - "SORGENTE": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #103 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Substations #92 - "ROSARA": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #112 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #118 - "Double": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #127 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #120 - "Single": 0.004 
   >> Power Lines #125 - "Single": 0.003 
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   >> Power Lines #126 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #127 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #160 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #75 - "FANO E.T.": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #80 - "MONTALTO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #80 - "MONTALTO": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #86 - "ROMA EST": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #83 - "ROMA SUD": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #116 - "PATERNO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #102 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #101 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #175 - "Double": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #115 - "Double": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #119 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #123 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #124 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #161 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #74 - "S. MARINO IN XX": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #74 - "S. MARINO IN XX": 0.001 
   >> Power Plants #20 - "Montalto C.le": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #81 - "AURELIA": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #87 - "ROMA NORD": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #82 - "ROMA OVEST": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #117 - "CHIARAMONTE GULFI": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #98 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #99 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #111 - "Double": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #121 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #116 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #122 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #176 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #117 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #110 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #122 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #121 - "Single": 0.003 
   >> Power Lines #162 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #72 - "FORLI ORAZIANA": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #73 - "RAVENNA CANALA": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #100 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #78 - "SUVERETO": 0.001 
   >> Power Plants #21 - "Torrevaldaliga Nord": 0.001 
   >> Power Plants #22 - "Torrevaldaliga": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #77 - "PIAN DELLA SPERANZA": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #95 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #96 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #97 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #100 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #92 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #89 - "Double": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #90 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #91 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #97 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #96 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #106 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #107 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #108 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #109 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #68 - "MARTIGNONE": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #191 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #67 - "FERRARA FOCOMORTO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #88 - "Double": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #66 - "PORTO TOLLE": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #48 - "MARGINONE": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #47 - "POGGIO A CAIANO": 0.001 
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   >> Power Substations #47 - "POGGIO A CAIANO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #86 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #190 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #62 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #69 - "COLUNGA": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #93 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #65 - "ADRIA SUD": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #181 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #72 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #70 - "Double": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #71 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #105 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #104 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Lines #72 - "Single": 0.002 
   >> Power Substations #53 - "DUGALE": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #46 - "BARGI STAZIONE": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #45 - "S. DAMASO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #87 - "Double": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #50 - "ACCIAIOLO": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #69 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #70 - "CALENZANO": 0.001 
   >> Power Substations #71 - "TAVARNUZZE": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #67 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #76 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #80 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #75 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #74 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #61 - "Single": 0.001 
   >> Power Lines #63 - "Single": 0.001 
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System Table after Event 2 
Key Name Value Class 
Power Substations VADO L. 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SOAZZA 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#1 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#2 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#3 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.050 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.038 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BULCIAGO 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#4 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#5 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BAGIO 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#6 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIEVE A 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VIGNOLE B. 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#7 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVAZZANO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA CASELLA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#8 0.059 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.050 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.098 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#9 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIACENZA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.096 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAORSO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CREMONA 0.058 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.096 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#10 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#11 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GORLAGO 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.034 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN CAMUNO 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations S. FIORANO 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NA#12 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FLERO 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NAVE 0.032 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LONATO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PARMA VIGHEFFIO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RUBIERA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. DAMASO 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.333 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations BARGI STAZIONE 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.333 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations POGGIO A CAIANO 0.054 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.088 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.090 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.045 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.045 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MARGINONE 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.045 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.023 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.023 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LA SPEZIA 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.025 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.059 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ACCIAIOLO 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations NOGAROLE ROCA 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Substations OSTIGLIA 0.024 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.040 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DUGALE 0.200 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.333 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations SANDRIGO 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CORDIGNANO 0.052 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.044 Fully Functional 
Power Substations UDINE OVEST 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Substations REDIPUGLIA 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DIVACA 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PLANAIS 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SALGAREDA 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VENEZIA NORD 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.031 Fully Functional 
Power Substations DOLO 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.031 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CAMIN 0.101 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RFX CNR 0.052 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations ADRIA SUD 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.218 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.426 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations PORTO TOLLE 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.218 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Double 0.426 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FERRARA FOCOMORTO 0.256 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.426 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.218 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations MARTIGNONE 0.391 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.651 Out of Order 
Power Substations COLUNGA 0.391 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.651 Out of Order 
Power Substations CALENZANO 0.102 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.086 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TAVARNUZZE 0.053 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FORLI ORAZIANA 0.766 Out of Order 
Power Lines Single 0.427 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.427 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.428 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.869 Out of Order 
Power Substations RAVENNA CANALA 0.501 Out of Order 
Power Lines Single 0.426 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.426 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.427 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations S. MARINO IN XX 0.257 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.219 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.219 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations FANO E.T. 0.262 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.224 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations CANDIA 0.137 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.119 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PIAN DELLA SPERANZA 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.023 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SUVERETO 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.023 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.023 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSEN 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTALTO 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.033 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Double 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Substations AURELIA 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.022 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA OVEST 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA SUD 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LATINA NUCLEARE 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.015 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VALMONTONE 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.017 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.012 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA EST 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.013 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROMA NORD 0.014 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CEPRANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Substations GARIGLIANO S.NE 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
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Power Substations VILLAVALLE 0.039 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.064 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSARA 0.072 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.119 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATRIA 0.007 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. MARIA CAPUA V. 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S. SOFIA 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.027 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PRESENZANO 0.021 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.018 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.026 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BENEVENTO 2 0.030 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.039 Fully Functional 
Power Substations VILLANOVA 0.075 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.070 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LARINO 0.049 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.054 Fully Functional 
Power Substations FOGGIA 0.046 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.038 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.038 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MONTECORVINO 0.029 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ANDRIA 0.045 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.061 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.060 Fully Functional 
Power Substations BARI O. 0.036 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.061 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MATERA 0.110 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.097 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.179 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.093 Fully Functional 
Power Substations TARANTO NORD 0.208 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.346 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.352 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations BRINDISI 0.062 Fully Functional 
Power Substations S.NE BRINDISI SUD 0.406 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.676 Out of Order 
Power Lines Single 0.346 Partially Disabled 
Power Substations GALATINA 0.207 Partially Disabled 
Power Lines Single 0.176 Fully Functional 
Power Substations MUSIGNANO 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations LAINO 0.056 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.048 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SCANDALE 0.005 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Substations RIZZICONI 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.002 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SORGENTE 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations PATERNO 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations CHIARAMONTE GULFI 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.001 Fully Functional 
Power Substations SERMIDE 0.047 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.078 Fully Functional 
Power Substations ROSSANO 0.011 Fully Functional 
Power Lines Single 0.017 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Vado L. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ferrera E. 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Tavazzano 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piacenza 0.020 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Spezia 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Ostiglia 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Edolo 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants San Fiorano 0.006 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Bargi Centrale 0.068 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rosen 0.002 Fully Functional 
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Power Plants Monfalcone 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Tolle 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Enipower Ravenna 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Porto Corsini 0.170 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Piombino Termica 0.009 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Montalto C.le 0.016 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga Nord 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Torrevaldaliga 0.004 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Brindisi Sud 0.750 Out of Order 
Power Plants Presenzano 0.008 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Rossano 0.019 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Roncovalgrande 0.003 Fully Functional 
Power Plants La Casella 0.010 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Sermide 0.087 Fully Functional 
Power Plants Dolo 0.034 Fully Functional 
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Abstract 
InSIEME (Infrastructure Security In Electricity Markets) is a GIS-based application that aims at supporting 
system analysis of complex, highly interconnected systems (i) by determining the reaction of such systems 
to abnormal initial events that affect their operability state and (ii) by providing visual spatial data 
representation of the system state. 
InSIEME is an application that targets business decision makers, policy makers, other stakeholders, 
professionals. The application is mainly designed for the evaluation of critical infrastructure systems, which 
usually are characterized by a large number of components from different, and not necessarily evident 
related, subsystems. The system under discussion in InSIEME is the Italian 360 kV Electricity Grid. 
InSIEME is developed as a CRISA (Critical Infrastructures Security Assessment Assistant) project, which 
confers increased capabilities of analysis of complex system architectures, as well as of the functionality, 
capabilities and interconnectivity of constituent parts, based on various types of data characterizing the 
system. In addition, two models - of error dispersion and influence flow were developed and implemented, 
in order to enhance the capabilities of the project in assisting decision making processes.  
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